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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Government is the largest single buyer of
commercial products or modified commercial products [57j
•
In its introductory comments in the area of commercial
products, the Commission on Government Procurement (COGP)
summarized the interaction of the Government and the commer-
cial market as follows [$ 5- 5]
'
As a "buyer of commercial products, the Government has
little influence on industrial practices. Prices are
established by competitive demand in the open market,
not by cost analysis. However, the procedures used to
sell to the Government and the degrees of risks assumed
by sellers under Government contracts differ from standard
commercial procedures and contracts.
The Government procurement process requires potential
suppliers to develop an information base concerning
Government needs and to respond to contractual solici-
tations in unique ways. These needs are expressed almost
exclusively through specifications or purchase descriptions.
Frequently, aggregate requirements for specific products
or services may be consolidated for central procurement
by a designated agency. Customer services or other
assistance normally offered to users in the private
sector are generally considered unnecessary by most
Government buyers in the interest of securing the lowest
possible price and of avoiding the appearance of favoritism.
A. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this research effort are: (l) to
briefly trace the development of current policy within the
Department of Defense regarding the acquisition of commercial
products, from the recommendations in this area by the
Commission on Government Procurement, through current attempts
to implement the Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial
8

Products (ADCP) Program; (2) to identify and discuss major
implementation obstacles and proposed solutions; (3) to
analyze the anticipated benefits of programs promoting
commercial product acquisition; and (4) to provide a prog-
nosis for formal implementation, i.e., where is the
commercial product acquisition program going?
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
In order to appropriately address the objectives of this
study the following research question is presented: What is
the current policy on buying commercial products within the
Department of Defense; how did it evolve; how is the current
policy implemented; what are the problems inherent in formal
implementation?
Subsidiary questions are addressed as follows: (1)
is the current policy compatible with the existing acqui-
sition environment in DOD, (2) how does the Acquisition
and Distribution of Commercial Products (ADCP) Program
interface with, or affect, existing policies concerning
specifications and standards; and what are the expected
benefits of the current policy to DOD as a whole?
C. SCOPS, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
Although the policy analysis portion of this paper
necessarily begins with overall Federal Government policy,
further agency policy development and implementation focuses
on the Department of Defense. It should be realized, that,
while a few other Federal agencies are mentioned for

emphasis or clarity, there are many actions in the area of
commercial commodity acquisition occurring in other agencies
which are not mentioned in this paper.
The title of the latest formal program on commercial
commodity acquisition is the "Acquisition and Distribution
of Commercial Products." While this paper naturally
addresses some logistics concerns, the thrust is toward the
"Acquisition" portion, and the discussion of logistics areas
are purposefully brief.
The policies and procedures utilized within the Government
to acquire commercial products are currently in a state of
flux, as evidenced by the background material. . .witness the
fact that the policy statement for the new Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) is in its third draft. Therefore any
conclusions and recommendations offered are necessarily
"point-in- time," and could soon be overtaken by events.
D. METHODOLOGY
1. Primary Research
a. The initial literature search revealed a myriad
of professional articles generated by the Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement and three subsequent
policy memoranda from the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy.
b. Following the initial literature search, a
two-day policy status trip was arranged to Washington, D.C.,
specifically to discuss commercial commodity acquisition




a. A two week fact-finding trip to Washington, D.C
included visits and interviews with all major participants
in the commercial commodity acquisition policy arena. High-
lights included a meeting between the FAR Project Office
representatives, and Department of Defense (DOD), Defense
Material Specifications and Standards Office (DMSSO), and
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) representatives
for discussion of proposed FAR coverage of the area in
question, and interviews at the Department of Defense,
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Research and
Engineering (USDR&E) ; the Office of the Secretary of the
Navy, Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (MRA&L) , the
Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) , the Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) , the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSSA)
,
the Naval Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX), and the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
b. Throughout the data analysis and draft
preparation of this paper, continuous updating phone calls
took place with representatives from the majority of the
offices mentioned above.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW
The 1972 Report of the Commission on Government
Procurement (COGP) provided the impetus for the current
flurry of activity concerning the acquisition of commercial
products. Numerous General Accounting Office (GAO) reports
are available on the subject throughout the period from the
11

Report to the present, some directly related to the Report
in the form of status reviews, and others on peripheral
subject matter. Following the issuance of three policy-
memoranda from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy on
commercial product acquisition, "based on the recommendations
by the COGP, numerous articles appeared on the subject in
various professional magazines, such as the Defense Manage-
ment Journal, Army Research and Development, and Contract
Management National Contract Management Association (NCMA),
As a result of the Washington visit, numerous drafts of
unpublished policy documents were obtained, including three
drafts of proposed FAR coverage, and other agency directives
and instructions on the subject. All of the literature
mentioned above is discussed herein, in either the back-
ground presentation or the discussions on policy and
implementation; some are discussed in detail, while others
are mentioned in passing.
?. KEY DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS
Definitions and abbreviations are contained in Appendix A,
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Following this "Introduction" are chapters on the
"Framework" (Chapter II), placing perspective on this research
area in respect to general acquisition policies and pro-
cedures, and "Background" (Chapter III), providing the reader
with, essentially, a chronological progression of policy
development and related reports up through "Current Policy
12

Analysis' (Chapter IV). Chapter V is a policy "Implementation
Analysis," including illustrated potential through analysis
of actual substitute, commercial product acquisitions.




The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) , 0MB Circular
No. A-76 states that "it has been and continues to be the
general policy of the Government to rely on competitive
private enterprise to supply the products and services it
needs" £522- Acquisition policy within the DOD generally
supports that doctrine, and the trend is to increase that
reliance. This is witnessed by the continuing revisions
of A-76, with its emphasis on contracting out for services,
and OMB Circular No. A-109* emphasizing the expression of
needs and program objectives in mission terms vice equip-
ment terms to encourage' innovation and competition.
Interviewees indicated, however, that a void remains
in the Government's reliance on the private sector in the
areas other than services and major systems, i.e., other
end items, equipment, components and material. Federal
agencies have historically developed and relied on detailed
design specifications to identify and define items in these
categories. Over the years, use of these specifications
has excluded commercial products from consideration, and
resulted in made-to-order products for the Government. Pro-
curement by detailed design specifications may cost more
than open market buying because of added requirements placed
on suppliers by the Government. In many cases a simple
change to provide for uniformity might serve to convert an
14

existing commercial item to one that meets the specification.
This paper therefore investigates the continuing attempt on
the part of the Federal Government (with emphasis on the
Department of Defense) to fill the "void" with a definitive
policy on how commercial commodities should be acquired.
Prior to this investigation, however, it would be helpful
to provide on overview of the Defense Specifications and
Standards Program, and, also, a brief look at the methods
currently most frequently utilized in the acquisition of
commercial products.
A. THE DEFENSE SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS PROGRAM
While primary responsibility for overall specification
and standard management rests with the General Services
Administration, authority is delegated to the Department of
Defense for management of Military Specifications and
Standards.
The principal executive for specification policy is the
Director for Material Acquisition Policy in the office of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) (Acquisition
Policy) . He is the chairman of the Defense Material
Specifications and Standards Board (DMSSB) , composed of top
managers from each military service and the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) . The Defense Material Specifications
and Standards Office (DMSSO) , located in the DLA Adminis-
trative Support Center, serves as the secretariat.
The DMSSB sets objectives, makes assignments, and
recommends changes to the specifications and standards
15

program. If necessary the Board establishes panels in
selected areas, such as electronics, audiovisual, clothing
and textiles, etc.
The basic organizational levels are indicated below,























Assignee activities develop annual specification
management plans for each federal supply class, and approve
new standardization projects. They are also the "policy
watchers," ensuring compliance with such policies as the
Acquisition and Distribution of the Commercial Products
Program addressed in this paper. The assignee activity
designates the organizational elements that will prepare or
revise specifications and standards. A recent article in
the Defense Management Journal commented on the effective-
ness of the system as follows [6oJ:
16

The raultilayered organizational structure has been
criticized as being so diffuse as to inhibit management
direction, and several studies have indicated a greater
need for centralization of authority. However, the
magnitude of DOD, the diversity of service objectives,
and the inherent nature of specification development
tend to cast great doubt on the efficacy of a central-
ized management approach.
One final item of particular interest in this area,
also discussed in the same article quoted above, is
summarized as follows [6o3
:
Although the Department of Defense recognizes the
need for a standardization strategy, it has not formally
publicized its goals. The Defense Material Specifications
and Standards Board met only twice in 1975. once in 1976,
once in 1977, and not at all in 1978. Thus is not sur-
prising that service commanders lack a strong commitment
to the accomplishment of tasks associated with a uniform
and coordinated specifications program.
B. COMMERCIAL PRODUCT ACQUISITION METHODS
Any discussion on the best way for the Government to
acquire commercial products produces advocates for every-
thing from sealed-bid awards based on design specifications
to multiple award schedules. Basically, those supporting
the sealed-bid approach argue that specifications can be
developed for every Government requirement. Some of these
supporters are beginning to advocate the use of functional
or design specifications, calling for simplified, shortened
purchase descriptions to assure maximum competition, without
the need to maintain detailed Federal or Military Specifi-
cations. Others support the related "two step" procurement,
whereby contractors offer a product design in response to
a functional specification, and those who's designs are
17

acceptable submit sealed-bids for award based on price
competition as the second step [67^.
Advocates of the multiple award schedule system argue
that the Government inhibits the introduction and use of
new technology by developing specifications, whether design
or functional, and making single awards. They further
suggest that this method allows the Government to take
advantage of off-the-shelf delivery, local service, and
better warranties. The final argument for multiple award
schedules concerns small businesses, all around the country,
who, under this method, may compete in their geographical
area the same way they compete for commercial business £67]
•
Legally, under the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 19^9 and the Armed Services Procurement Act
of 19^7, as implemented in the Defense Acquisition Regulation,
the solution as to the best method is simple, i.e., the
preferred method of procurement is the competitive sealed-
bid approach, requiring the development of product
specifications, if possible, and award to the lowest re-
sponsive and responsible bidder. This method is especially
effective to procure items that are not generally subject
to technological improvements, such as paint, paper,
packaging, or raw materials.
The multiple av/ard schedule system is utilized by GSA,
wherein they negotiate multiple, indefinite quantity,
annual contracts with contractors who offer similar prod-
ucts. The system is loosely justified by the exception
18

allowing negotiation when it is "impossible to develop an
adequate specification." This method assures the Government
of receiving commercial off-the-shelf products and utilizing
commercial distribution systems; however, it directly opposes
standardization.
Whereas the two methods previously discussed are utilized
in acquiring commercial products for centralized supply
systems, in point of fact, many agencies with differing
requirements for commercial products, ignore the central-
ized system and utilize what is referred to as "open market"
procurement. In this method, requiring agencies may also
use sealed-bid, competitive negotiation, or small purchase
procedures, and deal directly with the contractor. This
method would become more and more prominent under the new




A. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT
The recommendations of the Commission on Government
Procurement indicated the need for a shift in fundamental
philosophy relative to commercial product procurement. They
pointed out that the cost of commercial items generally
increased in proportion to the distance between requestor
and purchaser; that reliance on specifications necessarily
trailed the development of commercial products; that the
larger the chain of requirement submission, the more change,
simplification, or substitution; and that formal statements
of need were "cluttered" with protective and explanation
clauses. Within the discussion of the use of specifications
lay the recommendation which was to have the most impact
on future policy for the acquisition of commercial
products ("55 :18 J :
Require that development of new Federal Specifications
for commercial type products be limited to those that can
be specifically justified, including the use of total cost-
benefit criteria. All commercial product-type specifi-
cations should be reevaluated every five years. Purchase
descriptions should be used when Federal specifications
are not available.
It was also noted that most Federal specifications for
commercial products begin with a company's specification
(or several companies) circulated for change and/or comment,
20

and finally published, a procedure which is "costly, time
consuming, and often poorly coordinated" [55:19].
Following a discussion of the problem involving the
ungainly number and age of existing specifications and the
inherent problem of referencing, the report summarized other
problems as follows: [55:20]
(1) greater cost of specification when a comparable
commercial product exists
(2) federal specifications with specific designs may
deny the Government the benefits of technological
progress
(3) overly strict interpretation forces producers out
of Government work, reducing competition
{h) specifications establish minimum quality level,
negating offer of better quality
(5) specifications and standards result in averaging
of requirements; needs below the average are raised,
while those above are satisfied by exception
The generally accepted interpretation of the
recommendations of the GOGP was that agencies should meet
their procurement needs whenever possible from products
regularly manufactured and sold in the commercial market place
3. POLICY ON THE ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS
DISSEMINATED 3Y THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY
In May 1976, the recommendations of the COGP became
policy when OFPP issued a policy memorandum stating that [5lJ •
The Government will purchase commercial, off-the-shelf
products when such products will adequately serve the Govern-
ment's requirements, provided such products have an
established commercial market acceptability. The Government
will utilize commercial distribution channels in supplying
commercial products to its users.
This policy called for a change in philosophy and
distribution cost by [5l]
:
(1) stimulating competition




(3) avoiding specification development costs
(*0 reducing risk and costs associated with the storage
handling, and shipment of goods
The policy implied that detailed specifications were not
needed to either acquire or ensure the quality of an item
that has passed the competition test and been accepted in
the commercial market place. It further implied that the
Government should be able to establish performance and re-
liability of a commercial product through an effective market
research effort.
In a more specific policy memorandum in December 1976,
0?PP directed incremental implementation through test
programs on specified items [^9]»
The original policy objectives were fine tuned in the
December 19?6 memorandum including specific guidance to
maximize the use of commercial distribution channels;
reduce the number of Government stocked commercial items;
eliminate all unnecessary Government Specifications for
commercial products or the packaging of such items; and
tailor Government Specifications that cannot be eliminated
to reflect commercial practices to the maximum extent [l9]
•
Each agency was directed to "develop a general plan for
procuring and supporting commercial items," and to submit
completed plans to the Administrator of OFPP [l9J. Agencies
were directed to identify any constraints to implementation
of the new policy including examination of requirements,
22

forecast planning, market research, specifications,
socioeconomic impact, standardization, product inspection,
and others.
In their general guidance concerning the planning and
analysis phase, OFPP suggested that regulations not be
changed pending experience with the new policy, and further
that [^9}:
(1) the Government coordinate its forecasting of demands
with industry
(2) market research techniques "be required to gather data
on products, including quality, prices, producers,
distribution channels, and equitable formulas for
selection of qualified products
(3) improved management of warranties
The final discussion on specifications directed that
overly stringent Government Specifications be eliminated,
and that a system of purchase item descriptions be built
with an "update system" to simplify the competitive purchases
of commercial products. The need was recognized for closer
coordination between requirements developers, specification
writers, and industry. The creation of commercial-type items
by fragmenting features of already market-accepted commercial
products was prohibited [/+9 J •
A final memorandum in December of 1977 summarized progress,
formally incorporated individual agency programs, including
DOD's Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program (CCAP)
,
(discussed later in this chapter), and proposed a vigorous
schedule of major events [pol. Most of these milestones
have already been missed; for example, publishing of
23

uniform regulations, procedures, and techniques was scheduled
for March 1979.
C. ACQUISITION 0? COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Prior to the findings of the Commission on Government
Procurement, no specific policy existed within the DOD for
acquisition of commercial products. However, as a result of
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 19^9
(which required GSA to establish and maintain a Federal
Supply Catalog System and to prescribe standard purchase
specifications), and the Defense Cataloging and Standard-
ization Act of 1952 (which provided for standardization
through, the utilization of specifications and standards),
by 1972 there were more than 36,000 specifications in use
(more than 31,000 within the DOD) [55 :19J. The prolif-
eration of specifications and the requirement for their
use for recurring requirements, Defense Acquisition
Regulation (DAR) l-1202(a) , led to many of the problems
cited by the C0GP, and the subsequent recommendations for
a policy change.
Perhaps anticipating the 0FPP policy statements, DOD
awakened its own interest, first through a memorandum in
December 1975 discussing the general application of commer-
cial products to DOD requirements and establishing a steering
group to study the idea [2], and finally in a January 1977
memorandum formally establishing the "Commercial Commodity
Acquisition Program (CCAP) £3 1. " Whereas, the test program
2h

established by OFPP utilized small dollar value, rapid
utilization, stock items such as electrical, plumbing and
photographic supplies within DOD , CCAP nominated current
user requirements for more sophisticated larger dollar value
material, including an airborne navigational receiver
(ARMY), an airborne video tape recorder (Air Force), and a
navigation system (NAVY). The idea was "to exert the
greatest effort, in terms of planning and management, in
those product areas which promised the greatest payoff in
cost-of-ownership savings [^1 : 3^] • " Additional advantages
were anticipated through lower unit costs since DOD would
only pay a small share of the R&D, and take advantage of
lower costs due to high-volume commercial production. The
CCAP's sister program, Commercial Item Support Program
(CISP) , was established to review the minimum level of
centralized management required for all potentially commer-
cial items, while emphasizing maximum use of commercial
distribution channels. Both programs were incorporated by
O^PP's December 1977 memorandum into the overall policy now
formally titled the Acquisition and Distribution of Commer-
cial Products (ADCP) [50]
.
D. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS IN REGARD TO FEDERAL
ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS
The General Accounting Office has closely monitored
actions based on recommendations of the COGP. In addition
to periodic summary reports, they have also completed in-
depth studies and reports on specific items of interest.
25

One such study and subsequent report in 1977 considered the
application of Government specifications for commercial
products [32J. The general conclusion of the report was
that due to numerous conflicting factors, and the complexity
of Government Specification for commercial products, no one
approach is appropriate for the acquisition of commercial
products. In other words, "sound judgement and common sense
must be exercised on an individual case by case basis ["32:17].
According to GAO
, the need exists to give greater attention
to costs associated with specification development and
maintenance, as well as improved specification management.
In a status report issued 31 July, 1978 on those
recommendations of the COGP calling for legislative action,
GAO stated [33:19]:
At present, procurement regulations actually encourage
procurements based on government specifications instead
of competition between available commercial products.
Legislation may be needed to explicitly encourage use of
competition among commercial products and to restrict
issuance of new Federal Specifications.
Legislation is in process to modernize existing
procurement statutes. Enactment of this or similar
legislation could lead the way by emphasizing the
desirability of purchasing off-the-shelf commercial
products, cutting down on Government Specifications,
removing any lingering legal constraints, and helping to
overcome traditional resistance to change [_2j.
The report also noted that there had been no comment to
date on two specific aspects of the Commission's recommend-
ation, i.e., use of industrial funding, and continuous
evaluation of procurement and distribution systems on a
total cost basis. These recommendations were to force
26

recognition of costs hidden "by the limiting of handling
charges levied by GSA on interagency product transfers, thus
leading to understated catalog prices.
Commenting on the Defense Logistics Agency Test CCAP
achievements in the procurement of clothing and textiles at
the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) in April 1979,
GAO recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of
Defense "direct DLA and DPSC to immediately implement the
ADCOP policy on a full-scale basis, and to commit adequate
staff resources Id the effort [3^]." The responses of DLA
and the DOD are discussed in Chapter V.
In a 31 May 1979 report, partially entitled "A Final
Assessment," GAO summarized progress in the area of commer-
cial product reform by stating that "Although there have
been significant individual buys of commercial products,
Federal agencies have been slow to respond and key actions
are still required to fully integrate the policy into
procurement practice ["35 *
^6 J
.
" The "key actions" remaining
included [35]:
(1) linking commercial products procurement with greater
use of commercial distribution systems
(2) developing the proper model and organizational
structure to assure effective market research
(3) giving sufficient resources and attention to reviewing
existing specifications
(4) restricting Government Specifications in purchase
descriptions, and




S. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE STUDIES
Several task forces organized by the Defense Science
Board in the 1970* s have addressed problems concerning the
utilization of specifications in the acquisition of
commercial products.
1. Task Force on Reducing Costs of Defense Systems
Acquisition
Although mainly addressing commercial versus DOD
practices in regard to "Design-to-cost," the report of this
task force in March 1973 addressed several areas common to
systems and commercial product acquisition. For example, the
report states that [18 J:
the volume of specifications required for the design
and operation of a commercial transport is contained in
approximately 290 pages; the volume of specifications
required by DOD for the design of a single airplane model
may require 300 to 600 first-tier MIL-SPECS alone, and
tens of thousands of pages
.
While many of the problems addressed in this report have
been overtaken by 0MB Circular A-109. "Major Systems Acqui-
sition," some remain current. Another example cited was the
DOD procedure, having selected an item of commercial equip-
ment for a contract, of assigning Federal Stock Numbers to
commercial part numbers, but reverting back to the commercial
part number when affecting the procurement. The report
questions here the cost effectiveness of the DOD Standardi-
zation Program. The recommendations of the C0GP, 0FPP, and
GA0 were echoed concerning utilization of functional




In its final, long terra recommendations the task force
"stole the thunder": from OFPP's later policy, by
recommending [6l]
:
That a separate procurement regulation be issued to
cover commercial type equipments. It would specify only
performance requirements to meet the needs of the user.
This new procurement regulation would eliminate the
lengthy parts listings and numbering systems, and take
advantage of producers' world-wide standard parts
distribution system. DOD could then depend on commercial
parts service and maintenance manuals, which are much
simpler to follow than DOD technical manuals, and use
the producers' standard method for identifying superseded
parts. Thus DOD could rely on producers, and more fre-
quently than not, the product/equipment would be more
advanced, contain the latest improved materials, and
parts available, and be of higher quality.
2. Task Force on Electronic Test Equipment
This task force reported its findings and
recommendations in February 1976. They noted that the
services often use military specifications calling for
specially designed electronic test equipment when modified-
commercial or off-the-shelf equipment would perform the
required function. They further related that using these
specifications tended to complicate contract administration
and increase costs, delay delivery, foster the production of
obsolescent equipment , sharply increase logistics support
costs, and create operational, maintenance, and calibration
problems. The task group's 28 recommendations included
requiring justification for development of a new military
specification where off-the-shelf equipment can meet require-
ments, and reducing over-application of specification
requirements such as those dealing with environmental
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requirements; military parts, materials, and processes; and
excessive drawing and documentation requirements ["201.
3« Task Force on Specifications and Standards
The major emphasis of this study was on non-product
specifications and standards, such as quality control, con-
figuration management, reliability and maintainability,
etc. They considered that the main problems did not evolve
from the detailed content of the specifications, but rather
from their over-application and enforcement [l9*J • They did
concur with other studies, however, in their recommendations
to foster increased use of applicable commercial specifi-
cations and standards.
?. BACKGROUND SUMMARY
The recommendations of the COG? in regard to Federal
Government acquisition and utilization of commercial prod-
ucts, and their subsequent formalization by OFPP, have
created a flurry of activity in the Government, including
the Department of Defense.
Officials at all levels have created staffs, committees
,
and study groups to interpret the policy and search for
implementation vehicles, such as instructions, pamphlets,
or handbooks.
The Department of Defense, claiming its own initiative,
started the CCAP program, which moved the thrust of the
policy from small dollar value, stock items, bought to
existing specifications and standards, to large dollar value,




The following chapter examines the attempts at all
levels to expand and publish the policy in either existing
or new documents, from the proposed Federal Acquisition
Regulation to the DOD Directive and related documentation.
In reading subsequent chapters, it is important to keep
in mind the relatively simple (in theory) concept of the
proposed policy, i.e., the utilization of existing commercial
products and commercial distribution systems, where feasible
and cost effective, to meet Government requirements.
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IV. CURRENT POLICY ANALYSIS
This chapter provides an update and analysis of current
policy discussions and actions within Congress and the
Executive Branch, including OFPP and DOD, affecting the
acquisition of commercial products.
A. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REFORM ACT (SENATE BILL S.5)
This bill, introduced in the first session of the 96th
Congress, is intended to provide additional implementation
of many of the COGP recommendations. The bill was originally
introduced in the 9^th Congress as S.3005, and subsequently
in the first session of the 95th Congress as Senate Bill
S. 126*1. Many of the findings, conclusions, and recommend-
ations of the COGP permeate the bill from its first
declaration of policy, which summarizes the overall commission
report; i.e., purchasing laws are outdated, fragmented and
inconsistent; the result is inefficiency, ineffectiveness,
and waste in Federal spending; a new consolidated statutory
base is needed; and existing statutes need to be modernized
to focus on effective competition and new technology [_2?:3].
In the area of commercial product acquisition the bill
addresses some specifics, while other, more general sections
encompass the entire spectrum of reliance on the private
sector; i.e., major systems doctrines as contained in OMB
Circular A-109, the commercial-industrial programs of OMB
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Circular A-?6, and the objectives of the OFPP Acquisition
and Distribution of Commercial Products program.
The following areas are cited as examples [27:^-4l]:
SEC. 2. (b)(3) encourage innovation and the application of
new technology as a primary consideration by stating
agency needs and analyzing the market so that prospective
suppliers will have maximum latitude to exercise
independent business and technical judgements in offering
a range of competing alternatives.
SEC. 2. (b)(9) rely on and promote effective competition;
to insure the availability to the Government of alterna-
tive offers that provide a range of concept, design,
performance, price, total cost, service, and delivery;
and to facilitate the competitive entry of new and
small sellers.
TITLE I - REGULATORY GUIDANCE
SEC. 102. (a) (1) (D) The Administrator for Federal
Procurement policy is authorized and directed. .. to establish
and oversee a program to reduce agency use of detailed
product specifications.
TITLE II - ACQUISITION BY COMPETITIVE SEALED BIDS
SEC. 202. (c) To the maximum extent practicable and
consistent with needs of the agency, functional specifi-
cations shall be used to permit a variety of distinct
products or services to qualify and to encourage effective
competition.
SEC. 202. (d) The preparation and use of detailed product
specifications in a purchase description shall be subject
to prior approval by the agency head. Such approval shall
include written justification, to be made a part of the
official contract file, delineating the circumstances which
preclude the use of functional specifications and which
require the use of detailed product specifications in the
purchase descriptions.
TITLE III - ACQUISITION BY COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATION
SEC
.
302. (b) (1) . . .In any case, if price is included as a
primary or significant factor, the Government's
evaluation shall be based where appropriate on the total
cost to meet the agency need.
SEC. 302. (c) To the maximum extent practicable and consistent
with agency needs, solicitations shall encourage effective
competition by -
(1) Setting forth the agency need in functional terms
so as to encourage the application of a variety
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of technological approachs and elicit the most
promising competing alternatives,
(2) not prescribing performance characteristics
based on a single approach, and
(3) not prescribing technical approachs or
innovations obtained from any potential competitor.
SEC. 302. (3) (Same as SEC. 202. (d) above)
SEC. 51^. All specifications shall be reviewed at least
every five years, and shall be cancelled, modified,
revised, or reissued as determined by such a review.
Under definitions" the terms "total cost", as found in
SEC. 302. (b)(1), and "functional specification," as found
in SEC. 202. (c) are defined as follows [27:7-8] s
SEC. 3. For the purpose of this Act-(f) the term "total
cost" means all resources consumed or to be consumed in
the acquisition and use of property or services. It may
include all direct, indirect, recurring, non-recurring,
and other related costs incurred, or estimated to be
incurred in design, development, test, evaluation, pro-
duction, operation, maintenance, disposal, training, and
support of an acquisition over its useful life span,
whereever each factor is applicable,
(g) The term "functional specification" means a
description of the intended use of a product required by
the Government. A functional specification may include
a statement of the qualitative nature of the product
required and, when necessary, may set forth those minimum
essential characteristics and standards to which such
product must conform if it is to satisfy its intended
use.
The bill also recognizes that competitive negotiation
is just as valid an acquisition technique as competitive
sealed bidding, and indicates that the multiple award
schedule system is an acceptable competitive negotiation
technique.
The researcher would observe that while this bill may
not be passed during the 96th Congress, due to more pressing
matters such as SALT II and energy, the philosophy is
reflective of present day procurement practice, and
3^

if not passed, will surely be re-introduced into the next
Congress.
B. THE NATIONAL SUPPLY SYSTEM
Proponents of OFPP's Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products program received a boost on 9 August
1979 when the President formally approved the establishment
of a National Supply System. This was immediately followed
by issuance of a preliminary definition and a schedule for
preliminary implementation of the system, under the
Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy and the
National Supply System Advisory Board.
The System is defined as "a uniform, integrated
Federal-wide system for the acquisition, supply, and dis-
tribution of personal property and related services, with
authority to establish, enforce, and monitor policies and
procedures, world wide in scope and application [68:1J."
Among other objectives is the proviso for a greater
degree of reliance on the private sector.
Twelve specific "functions" are listed, one of which is
"A Standard System for the Acquisition of Material," from
'Requirements Forecasting" to "Award" [68]. Listed as
programs and actions currently underway in support of this
function are the Federal Acquisition Regulation, unified
policy guidelines for implementation of the Acquisition
and Distribution of Commercial Products Program, improved
Multiple Award Schedule Contract Program, Market Research
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and Analysis Programs, and implementation of Major Systems
Acquisition Policy (0MB Circular A-109).
There is much current debate over the potential impact
of the National Supply System. In his cover memorandum
to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the
President stated "To support this action I am requesting that
you advise the heads of the executive departments and agen-
cies of the priority which I assign to this project [68]."
This direction is contrary to testimony by Dale W. Church,
Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Policy,
given during hearings in March on the OFPP, where he cited
the establishment of the National Supply System as one of
the OFPP pursuits that should be given lower priority in
order that they might pursue matters closer to significant
procurement policy.
C. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR)
Perhaps the single most important objective for the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, established at its
founding in 197^ » was the completion of a single, uniform,
simplified, consolidated set of Federal acquisition regul-
ations. That goal has been reaffirmed as the number one
priority by recent legislation extending the life of OFPP
for an additional four years. The drafting of the FAR is a
joint effort involving OFPP, DOD , the General Services
Administration (GSA), National Aeronautic and Space Admin-
istration (NASA), and the Department of Energy (DOS). The
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original time schedule was for completion of all drafts
by the end of January 1979, with publication in August 1979.
Indications are that completion and publication may now be
expected by summer 1980.
The stated objectives of the FAR are "to reduce
proliferation of regulations, eliminate conflicts and
redundancies within and between regulations, and, most
importantly, to provide a uniform regulation that is simple,
clear, and understandable [58]." Publication of the FAR
will not obviate the requirement for individual agency
regulations, which will still be required to implement
FAR policies and procedures. However, the Defense Acqui-
sition Regulation (DAR) will no longer be a complete, free
standing document under which to contract within DOD.
Utilizing the DAR as the basic model (since it is more
detailed and comprehensive) , assignments were split about
equally between DOD and GSA, with NASA drafting coverage
of R&D contracting, and DOE drafting coverage on Government-
owned, contractor-operated plants. The DOD assignments are
being drafted by the FAR project office (FARPO), with
representatives from Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA. All
drafts by all agencies are reviewed by each agency, and
finally by a panel composed of two policy members, two
attorneys, and two editors [581.
Completed draft sections are advertised for comment
(including comment by industry and the general public) in
the Federal Register. The format utilized consists of three
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columns representing new proposed FAR coverage, and current
coverage in both the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR)
and the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR).
While the drafters of the FAR have no charter to make
sweeping policy changes, they have been tasked with incor-
porating the provisions of the proposed Federal Acquisition
Reform Act not contrained by current laws, including the
adoption of "commercial practices to the extent it is
feasible to do so [58*].'
This last task of incorporating the provisions of S.5
into the FAR became the avenue for including OFPP's policy
statement and subsequent program on the Acquisition and
Distribution of Commercial Products. It was in the drafting
of this section of the FAR that an inevitable conflict,
brewing slowly since the recommendations of the COGP,
surfaced between the proponents of the ADCP philosophies and
the "old guard" of the Defense Material Specifications and
Standards Office (Refer to Chapter II). It was convenient
that all of the top "players" resided in one office--the
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense R&D
(Acquisition Policy) . The Director for Material Acquisition
Policy (Chairman of the Defense Material Specifications and
Standards Board), the FAR Project Office, and the Assistant
for Commercial Acquisition all exist within that office.
Every study and/or report on Federal acquisition of
commercial products, since the report of the COGP, in some
way attacked either policy or procedure in regard to the use
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of specifications. However, it was the attempted drafting
of the FAR which eventually necessitated a meeting of the
minds from the two areas; it has not been an easy resolution.
To date, three separate drafts of the FAR sections relating
to ADCP and specifications have circulated for comment.
It is important to note prior to analysis of the drafts,
that there is in the DAR (Section 1, General Provisions,
Part 12) separate detailed coverage of specifications,
plans, and drawings, while there is no comparable coverage
specifically relating to commercial product acquisition.
Reviev/ing the proposed major subdivisions of the FAR, reveals
a separate part (1-10), in the subchapter on "Acquisition
Planning," dedicated to "Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products." There is no such part dedicated
to the area of specifications. As in the DAR, coverage
of specifications was to be included somewhere within a
part of that same subchapter.
The following portion of this chapter analyzes the three
FAR drafts relating to the two areas.
1. FAR Draft #1 (March 1979)
In March there was no separate draft for a section
on specifications; that input had been received from DMSSO
to be incorporated into the decided subchapter. However, a
separate draft of Part 10, Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products, was submitted to the FAR Project Office.
This draft was close to the "separate procurement regulation"
for commercial products recommended by the Defense Science
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Board in 1973 (see IIIE1). This particular draft is
important to analyze in detail since it is the best com-
pilation of ideas to date of the proponents of the ADCP
program.
This first draft consisted of six major subparts
and twenty-one sections ranging from a policy statement and
user needs identification to user satisfaction and experience.
The intended scope included policy and procedures in acquir-
ing privately developed, commercially available systems,
products, and related support services for Government use
in accomplishment of agency missions and responsibilities.
While the part was not intended to apply to those special
categories of contracting addressed in Subchapter ? of the
FAR (see Appendix B) , the principles were to be used in
acquisition of commercial products when they were a part
of those categories.
The policy statement was an expanded combination of
the original policy statement from OFPP and some of the
terminology utilized in S.5« For example, the use of
commercial products "in lieu of special design products"
was emphasized. Incorporated also were the enhancement of
competition through the use of functional specifications,
the idea of user needs satisfaction at least-total-cost to
the Government, and solicitation terms and conditions
designed to conform with commercial practices in order to




Definitions used in this draft included the same
definitions used herein for "commercial" or "off-the-shelf"
product, and "commercial-type" or "modified commercial"
product; however, one new definition, not formerly quanti-
fied, was introduced--that of "market research and analysis,"
an area soon to become an implementation source of dis-
content in terms of organizational responsibility. The
draft definition follows [62]:
Market research and analysis means the techniques used to
determine the availability of commercial products and
sources that will meet Government needs, the extent of
commercial market competition, the range of product per-
formance characteristics, market acceptability, current
market prices, and the range of available distribution
systems and support services. It also means an analysis
of what is available as related to user needs for purposes
of developing a sound acquisition strategy.
The discussion of user needs, requirement determination,
and product suitability first introduced what was later to be
formalized as the step-by-step methodology of matching user
needs with existing products. The idea involved continuing
dialogue between the user activity, product line manager,
and the commercial market place. In the methodology, if a
suitable match was not found, consideration v/as next given to
revising the need in light of the availability of existing
products. Perhaps new capabilities or lower cost substitutes
would be discovered in the market research and analysis.
The next step called for the possibility of modifying an
off-the-shelf product to meet the need. The last, and least
desirable step would be design of a new item. With recurring
needs, where special design products had resulted from past
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acquisition practices based on detailed design
specifications, the potential for use of commercial products
that provide a more economical, efficient, and effective
alternative should be explored.
This same section was also very specific in stating
that requirements would be depicted to reflect the function
to be performed, with identification of those constraints
and parameters of form and fit that would be critical in
the environment of the intended use.
Finally, the subject of standardization was addressed
briefly. While the need for some standardization was
recognized, it was also emphasized that since requirements
vary in level of quality needed, a single standard would
exceed some needs and be deficient in others. The need
therefore was again recognized to evaluate standardization
programs based on the concept of least-total-cost, including
evaluated item price, cost of the acquisition process, and
cost of ownership.
From its earlier brief definition of market research
and analysis, the draft proceeds into a detailed subpart
including responsibilities and requirements, preparation
and conduct, cost/benefit trade-off analysis, and prepara-
tion/distribution of reports on research and analysis effort.
As mentioned earlier, this area was to become a major concern
in regard to organizational placement and responsibility.
The draft required that all heads of Government
Departments and agencies establish systems for conducting
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market research and analysis, coordinating and documenting
results, and maintaining records as a means of providing
ongoing market intelligence for future acquisitions to meet
the same or similar needs. Responsible offices were to be
formally identified organizationally to coordinate all other
functional areas comprising the acquisition process, to
assume that significant decisions were based on best avail-
able information and advice through the research and analysis
effort.
Market research and analysis was to be required for
every product or product line for which product managers
had been established, and for any acquisition estimated in
excess of .§10,000. However, if past or current acquisitions
provided general knowledge of the availability and accept-
ability of widely used commercial products, the research
and analysis could be limited in that particular situation.
It was also recognized that requirements for certain special
needs of the Government, clearly not found in the commercial
market, would not require market research and analysis,
such as military weapons. Recurring acquisitions of non-
commercial products would require research on a cyclic
basis, in particular those items most likely to have
commercial counterparts.
The organization conducting market research and
analysis would have to be totally cognizant of the users'
needs, including, for instance, health and safety factors,
all planned applications, critical quality features,
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environment, etc. The degree of consultation involved
between all parties would depend of course on the com-
plexity, urgency, and dollar value.
Cost/benefit trade-off analysis would be required
where a commercial product could meet the need by modifi-
cation either of the product or the requirement. Such
things as estimates of the cost of modification and impact
on supply and support costs and capabilities would have to
be considered, as well as the affect on competition and
socio-economic programs.
The results of research and analysis would be
utilized to develop the acquisition strategy, and would also
be preserved to assist in future acquisitions.
The discussion on acquisition strategy differed
little from any other acquisition strategy, i.e., form of
contract, contract specifications, solicitation method,
evaluation criteria and selection for award, etc. The
objective would be to take full advantage of what the
commercial market has to offer, as disclosed by the research
and analysis, by structuring the contract specification
and the contracting method and techniques to be employed
in a manner that encouraged the submission of a wide range
of acceptable products that may vary significantly in price,
quality, performance, or conditions of sale or support
options; allowed the Government to select the product
delivery system, and the logistics support option that will
result in least total cost; and assured user need satisfaction.
Vt

One additional major advantage detailed in this
draft in acquiring off-the-shelf products is their ready-
availability to meet market demands at diverse locations.
The comparison of commercially available distribution
systems and Government distribution systems in the "least-
total-cost" formula is an area of growing interest,
especially in DOD, through the Commercial Item Support
Program (GISP). That discussion is, however, beyond the
scope of this work. The concept is addressed briefly later
in "Areas for Further Research."
Another area of considerable concern to users in
any discussion of commercial products utilization is
product performance and reliability assurance. This draft
identified a variety of options for determination of those
factors, for example, commercial market acceptability (See
"Definitions*')t pre-award testing, qualified products, first
article testing, contractor warrantees, independent labora-
tory testing, quality control, consumer organization tests
and reports, and bid samples. Factors to be considered in
the decision of which one or combination of the above to
utilize included, the potential cost and effects of product
failure, safety, defense readiness, intended use, and
environment. Commercial market acceptability is again
highlighted as possible relief from the more costly and
time consuming of those methods. The idea was again, that
products v/ith substantial sales over extended periods to
commercial customers for similar needs might demonstrate
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acceptability and reliability without further action. Care
must be taken, however, not to let this idea eliminate from
competition newly developed, better performing, or less
costly items in high technology products that have not yet
had time to establish their value in the market place.
System flexibility would allow such things in the solici-
tation as established eligibility criteria with respect to
contractor qualifications or product acceptance in the
marketplace. The draft allowed contracting officers to
develop and apply such criteria, tailored to meet the needs
of a particular acquisition, consistent with the overall
objective of acquiring off-the-shelf commercial products.
As in any acquisition, the decision concerning
evaluation criteria and selection for award is critical
in acquiring commercial products. This draft continued in
this area to emphasize the lowest evaluated price or least
total cost criteria, depending on the practicability of
assigning specific dollar values or applying subjective
value judgement to specific characteristics and quality
levels. Other possible evaluation factors considered in-
cluded: anticipated life of the item, estimated maintenance
and repair costs, energy consumption, commercial warranties,
distribution systems, trade-ins, etc.
The final requirement levied by this draft involved
the giving and receiving of user experience, wherein users
would be apprised of their opportunity and responsibility
for informing designated offices of such things as product
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failures and deficiencies, supply or support systems
shortcomings, contract failures, other inadequacies, and
suggested corrective action. Offices assigned responsibility
for receiving and acting on such information would inform
contract administration offices, document market research
and analysis files, and inform all other elements as
appropriate.
In summary, if approved for the FAR, this draft would
have been essentially a stand-alone acquisition guide for
commercial products. Several factors combined to make such
a scenario an impossibility. These factors are addressed
in the following section on the second draft of FAR, Part 10.
2. FAR Draft ^2 (August 1979)
In August 1979. those parties interested in the
commercial products acquisition area were notified that the
FAR Project Office had completed its draft of Part 10, and
that a meeting would be held at OFPP to "fine-tune" the
part for publication. Several days prior to the meeting,
copies of the draft were circulated to provide working
copies to those involved. The researcher attended the
meeting as a guest of the USD(R&S). It was obvious by the
reactions that the meeting would be more than a "fine-
tuning. " The FAR Project Office had combined the DOD draft
on commercial products, and the input from DMSSO on
specifications and standards into a new Part 10, entitled
"Specifications and Commercial Products [29]." Up until
this time, the "rice bowl" of the specifications world had
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remained in tact in the move from DAR to FAR. However, now
the two ends of the spectrum had been meshed, uncomfortably,
in the same part.
This paper will not attempt an analysis of this
draft in the detail of the analysis of draft #1. Suffice
it to say that neither the drafters of the specifications
input nor the commercial products input were pleased with the
new draft. The representatives from DMSSO were very unhappy
at the idea of being a "subset" of this FAR part. In
addition, their input had been altered beyond recognition,
i.e., definitions had been added, deleted, or changed
(including ageless definitions such as "specification" and
"standard"), emphasis had been shifted in various areas
without their knowledge, and the entire part was inter-
mingled, sometimes at random, it would seem, with excerpts
from the commercial products draft [.29].
The researcher observed that those who represented
the commercial products draft were annoyed that their
thirty-plus page dissertation had been cut, pasted and
spliced, until, at a mere five pages, it was but a shadow
of its former self... its "teeth" removed.
The meeting, and this second draft, are history;
instead of a fine-tuning affair, the meeting quickly de-
generated into a heated discussion which ranged from
specifics of the draft to questions on what exactly was
the charter of the FAR Project Office. Finally, after an
accusation by one official (who shall remain un-named) that
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the FAR Project Office 'operated in a vacuum!," it was
determined that representatives at the working level from
each area should meet to resolve the issues.
3- FAR Draft #3 (October 1979)
At the time of this writing, the third draft is
being circulated for comment, with interesting and quite
dramatic changes. In its newest form, this part of the FAR
is now two parts - Part 10, entitled "Specification, Stan-
dards, and Other Product Descriptions," and Part 11,
(formerly reserved (see Appendix B)), entitled "Acquisition
and Distribution of Commercial Products [30"]."
It is the opinion of this writer that, if what had
transpired prior to the issuance of this draft was con-
sidered a battle between the proponents of specifications
and standards and those for the commercial products acqui-
sition approach, the results would have to be called a
draw - both appear to be winners.
Part 10 on specifications neatly preserves the duties
and responsibilities of those involved, and perhaps expands
them with its incorporation of the COGP recommendations
and the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act.
Policies included maximizing the use of functional and per-
formance-type descriptions, and provided for a new series of
formerly documented descriptions, commercial item descriptions




...A brief, simple product description formalized under
the specifications program and used in the acquisition
of commercial or commercial-type products. Commercial
item descriptions are issued or controlled by the General
Services Administration (GSA) and listed in the General
Services Administration Index of Federal Specifications
and Standards (GSAIFSS).
This part also calls for the elimination of
unnecessary Federal Standards in packaging, packing, and
marking, and limits reference materials to those which are
>
essential.
Policies contained in this part that are not
presently covered in the DAR or FPR include (1) the establish-
ment of a preference for the use of voluntary standards to
communicate the Government's needs and for the use of
commercial item descriptions to acquire commercial products
when voluntary standards cannot be used, (2) the establish-
ment of a preference for the use of functional specifications
when voluntary standards and commercial item descriptions
are not appropriate, (3) "the elimination of brandname-or-
equal descriptions which became unnecessary with the use
of functional specifications and commercial item descriptions,
and (*0 the requirement that agencies establish a system of
user feedback on centrally managed product descriptions,
the products acquired under the product descriptions, and
the associated logistics system. In reality, most of the
new material in this part seems to have been taken from the
first draft on commercial product acquisition.
Parts 10 and 11 should be totally pleasing to those
who put so much effort into the first draft; for it seems
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that whatever material from that draft did not make it
into Part 10 on specifications, certainly was retained in
Part 11 on ADCP. Following a very simple policy statement,
essentially the same as the original OPPP statement, there
is a natural lead-in from the Part 10 requirement for needs
to be expressed in functional terms [30*1:
11.003 General.
Acquisition of commercial products begins with a
description of the Government's needs stated in
functional terms in sufficient detail so that market
research and analysis can be used to determine the
availability of commercial products, distribution systems,
and logistics support to fill those needs.
From that statement, Part 11 is essentially a rehash
of the first draft, in much more concise terms, covering
market research and analysis, product acceptability,
evaluation and award, and distribution options.
One very essential addition to this part answers a
question posed quite vehemently following OFPP's initial
policy statement and follow-on guidance, concerning small
and minority businesses who were created for, and survived
solely on, Government business in commercial-type products




When user needs previously fulfilled by acquisition
of products produced under detailed specifications are
to be fulfilled by acquisition of commercial or commercial-
type products under this Part 11, the contracting officer
must consider the impact on previous producers, particu-
larly those that are small or disadvantaged business
concerns. Provided that they meet user needs, products
previously produced and acquired under detailed specifi-
cations shall continue to be considered for acquisition
for a reasonable, limited period in order to give pro-
ducers time to develop commercial markets. The
contracting officer shall determine the period to be
allowed on a case-by-case basis after consultation with
the previous producers, technical personnel, and the
activity's small and disadvantaged business utilization
specialists.
In summary, it would appear that, regardless of the
status of the remaining sections of the FAR, these parts
will finally "make it to the printers." In the minds of the
drafters it is a workable policy document; however, as
evidenced in the next chapter's discussions on implement-
ation to date, this battle may be over, but the war has
just begun.
D. FURTHER POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN DOD
Most agencies by 1978 figured that if they in fact were
to wait for the normal policy flow from FAR to DAR, to policy
directives and implementing instructions, it could be years
before they could react to the recommendations of the COGP
as proclaimed by OFPP. So while the FAR coverage of ADCP
was yet embryonic, several actions were taken within DOD to
further the general ADCP policy statement of OFPP. Those
actions are discussed in the following sections.
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1. Defense Standardization Manual (POD 4120. 3-M) Revision
In August of 1978 the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense (Research and Engineering) issued a revised
Defense Standardization Manual (DOD 4120. 3-M), "Defense
Standardization and Specification Manual (DOD 4120. 3-M)
,
"Defense Standardization and Specification Program Policies,
Procedures and Instructions." Contained therein was a new,
two-page Chapter VI, entitled "Specifications for Commercial
Products," which essentially restated the OFPP policy and
purpose. The chapter further provided that [21"]
Military or Federal specifications for commercial
products will not be prepared unless one or more of the
following applies:
a. Required to give visibility necessary to avoid
duplication of product descriptions,
b. Required to avoid proliferation of products in the
DOD Supply System,
c. Required to enable government documentation and
change control for application to or as components
of weapons systems,
d. Required by law, regulations, or foreign treaties or
agreements
,
e. No acceptable non-government document exists or is
expected to be available when needed.
If the new FAR Parts 10 and 11 are issued as they now
stand, limitation (a) above would be waived, (b) would require
a least-total-cost evaluation, and (e) would disappear.
The final section, on specification content in
those instances where it is determined that a Military or
Federal Specification is required for commercial or commercial-
type products, would be absorbed into the utilization of
Commercial Item Descriptions (CID).
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The manual will require extensive revision upon
publication of the FAR.
2. DODD 5000.37, "Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products (ADCP) "
Almost two and one half years after the initial OFPP
policy and memorandum on ADCP of May 1976, and almost one
year following the second OFPP implementation guidance
memorandum of December 1977 » DOD issued its first official
policy document on ADCP in the form of DOD Directive 5000.37
of September 29. 1978, entitled "Acquisition and Distri-
bution of Commercial Products (ADCP). The policy statement
within this directive is simply a rehash of the OFPP state-
ment, except for the fact that it is separated into two
sub-policy statements. The first statement addresses the
"
•purchase " of commercial, off-the-shelf products, while the
second addresses the use of commercial " distribution
channels [2^J." The reason for the split policy statement
is made clear in the next section of the directive which
assigns the responsibility for implementation of the
"acquisition policy aspects of ADCP" to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&S) , and the
responsibility for implementing the "logistics policy for
ADCP" to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics (ASD(MRAd-L) ) [2^]. This
seemingly natural split was to become the source of some
contention during attempted implementation.
5^

According to the Directive, ADCP policies "apply to
requirements for all end items, weapons, equipment, com-
ponents or material for which commercial products are used
or can be used, including principal and secondary items [3^]."
A review of the seven objectives reveals an almost
direct transition from the three OFPP memoranda. Finally,
DOD components are given rather broad guidelines involving
review and revision of applicable internal directives,
regulations and instructions, and determination and desig-
nation of items with potential for coverage by this policy.
Components were directed to provide copies of implementing
documents to USDR&E within 120 days.
3. Related DOD Policy Actions to Date
In early 1979 » with as yet no implementation
documents from the services in response to their directive,
no FAR policy statement on the horizon, and its own draft
implementing instruction under fire, USDR&E dusted off two
old ADCP policy documents to essentially fan the fires of
enthusiasm in the interim.
The first was an in-house, one-page memorandum, dated
11 January 1979 > promoting ADCP "Management Objectives. ' The
age of the document was obvious from its second sentence,
stating that "Policy and an acquisition methodology will be
developed during 1978 and promulgated in 1979 in support of
this objective.
"
The second document of interest appeared as Item IV
in Defense Acquisition Circular (DAC) #76-18, dated 12 March
1979, entitled "Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial
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Products (ADCP) Policy Objectives." This also appears to
have been a much earlier draft in that it also included the
identical statement of optimistic goals concerning the
development and promulgation of policy and acquisition
methodology during 1978 and 1979.
The Defense Acquisition Circular served several
purposes; first, it re-emphasized the concepts and objectives
of the DOD Directive; second, it identified the fact that
the CCAP and CISP programs had "surfaced several problems
that are being resolved by providing guidelines to DOD
components through a new DODI now being staffed"; and third,
it provided a very good, concise summary of areas which would
require management attention once the new FAR became a
reality. It provided an overview of market research and
analysis; the need for user and specification v/riter to
determine criteria for defining 'established commercial
product acceptability" ; and the development of functional
purchase descriptions or specifications "that reflect
technology of the market-place."
One very important apparent organizational decision
was subtly slipped into the middle of this general paragraph
in the DAC ; that being the very clear statement that "the
search and analysis function is an element of the acqui-
sition process and is accomplished by the requirements and




4. Formal Policy Implementation Within the Services
The next chapter is devoted to the current status
of implementation of the DOD policy to date, including an
evaluation of the DODI (draft), the Army's pamphlet on the
acquisition of non- developmental items (draft), DLA '
s
response to GAO ' s recommendation for full scale implementation,
Navy's struggles in the offices of the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (MRA&L) and the Chief of Naval Material, and
Air Force's apparent wait-and-see approach. Suffice it to
say at this point that none of the agencies have as yet





As stated in Chapter IV, no agency has yet promulgated
formal implementation documents, including agencies in DOD
directed to do so by DODD 5000. 37. interviewees confirmed
that the most obvious reason for this apparent disregard
of stated policy is the lack of a definitive policy state-
ment in the FAR, and therefore no amplification in agency
regulations. There have been, however, several attempts by
the services to implement the general policy in the interim,
through directives, pamphlets, and test programs. This
chapter examines current implementation status, including an
evaluation of proposed DAR changes, proposed changes to the
Federal Property Management Regulation (FPMR) and the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR)
,
proposed DOD implementing
instruction with service comment, individual service imple-
mentation, results of the DOD/National Bureau of Standards
workshop on commercial product acquisition, and, finally,
a review of several successful test acquisitions by each
agency.
A. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATION (DAR)
The incorporation of the ADCP program into the DAR was
assigned case Number 78-6^4- for DAR Subcommittee 78-6^. In
July 1978, the Assistant for ADCP in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) submitted proposed changes
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to the DAR Council, including new material not presently-
covered in the regulation and revisions to existing coverage
which may be in conflict with ADCP policy.
Consideration of appropriate positioning of the new
policy coverage within the DAR led to the recommendations
that DAR 1-304, presently entitled "Procurement of Privately
Developed Items," be replaced entirely by ADCP. Material
presently in that section was considered to be mostly re-
dundant, and that which was not redundant was recommended
for relocation elsewhere.
Since the proposed DAR changes were drafted by the same
office which prepared the FAR proposal, the material in the
ADCP proposal for DAR 1.304 is essentially the same as that
in the FAR, with a few exceptions for further clarification.
Stated policy and objectives are essentially identical (See
Chapter IV, Section C.I.), as are definitions, exceptions,
statement of user needs, market survey, and review of
recurring requirements.
While the basic discussion of standardization
considerations is the same, the following amplification
of policy in this regard is offered [64: TAB A]:
Not withstanding the application in contracting of
Military and Federal Specifications and Standards as
authorized under 1-304.3 (exceptions) and as necessary
to meet the special needs of certain users, the less
demanding needs of other users will be satisfied through
acquisition of commercial products consistent with the
policies, objectives and exceptions stated in 1-304.1
and 1-304.3.
D0D components and sub-components, as appropriate,
will establish internal procedures designed to recognize
and take advantage of opportunities for reducing defense
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costs by applying different military/commercial standards
in the acquisition of similar products to meet differing
conditions of use. This may involve, for example, initial
or continuing requirements for DOD inventories of more
costly products produced to a Military or Federal
Specification, for certain uses, as well as local purchases
(or orders placed against Federal Supply Schedule con-
tracts) for commercial products for other similar but
less demanding uses. Authorization for local purchase of
less costly versions of similar products to meet less
demanding needs should be the rule rather than the
exception. Appropriate modifications to systems for
item identification, ordering, and requisitioning shall
be made to recognize these differences within the same
commodity groups or classes, both with respect to
initial requirements and recurring requirements.
The discussion on contracting procedures for commercial
products centered mostly on the necessity to evaluate com-
petitive offers of commercial or commercial-type products
on the basis that would assure that advantages in regard
to established sales and distribution systems and the
potential for avoidance of special testing and other
quality assurance/control procedures are not lost. Specifi-
cally, this section called for the establishment of monetary
and other value factors, appropriately weighted, to allow
for the selection of the product that represents the least
total cost/best value decision. As mentioned in the DAR
draft, these factors could include: anticipated life,
estimated maintenance and repair costs, commercial warranties,
testing needs, quality control waivers, and commercial
distribution systems.
In addition, this draft would allow for a negotiation
exception where the evaluation factors selected could not
effectively be applied under formal advertising procedures
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(either one or two step), and the benefits sought would
otherwise be lost. This would necessitate a change to
the negotiation exception in DAR 3-210.2. Paragraph (xiii)
would be changed to read "when it is impractical to draft. .
.
adequate specifications..." vice " impossible . " A new
paragraph, (xix), would be added as follows [6^:TAB c]:
When it is impossible to draft, for a solicitation
of bids, an adequate and precise formula to be applied
in the evaluation process, v/ithout the exercise of inde-
pendent judgement, for selection of a product from among
two or more competing products, that represents the least
total cost, best value to the Government, considering
price, quality, durability, life and other factors.
In the discussions accompanying the draft submission it
was emphasized that the above revisions were considered
highly desirable to take advantage of the greater flexibility
permitted in negotiation in order to evaluate the relative
merits of competing products; a procedure not always possible
where the rigid requirements of formal advertising must be
followed. Since negotiation exceptions are legal decisions,
difficulties were anticipated in making the changes; however,
it was noted that the statute (10 USC 230^ (a) 10) used the
term "impractical vice "impossible."
The only other changes recommended in this draft v/ere
in "General Provisions," under Part 12, Specifications, Plans,
and Drawings. One paragraph, 1-1202, was added concerning
specifications for commercial products, and referring to
the new proposed Section 1-30^. The only other addition
concerned the restricted utilization of specialized packaging
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and marking requirements where commercial practices would
suffice.
The issue receiving most attention in the discussion
accompanying the draft was that of the OFPP use of the term
"Commercial Market Acceptability." It was noted that the
use of that term as a standard test that must be met for
commercial product awards, presents problems, and that it
was considered preferable to avoid its use in the contracting
process. It was the interpretation of the drafter that the
intent of the OFPP policy with respect to commercial market
acceptability was to secure benefits by use of commercial
products and distribution systems and not to limit purchases
by a clause or solicitation provision. It was further con-
cluded that this intent could be achieved by first utilizing
the market survey to determine the acceptability of avail-
able commercial products to fill a need, and, second,
developing product evaluation criteria to meet the need at
least total cost. In other words, the term "Commercial
Market Acceptability" would be used only in establishing
policy with respect to market surveys and not separately
defined for use in solicitations.
At the time of this writing, DAR Case Number 78-6^,




3. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION - FEDERAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS
In March 1979 the General Services Administration issued
for comment a temporary Federal Property Management Regu-
lation (FPMR), Temporary Regulation E-59, prescribing
policies and procedures for the management of specifications,
standards, and descriptions for commercial products.
According to the draft the regulation was to be incorporated
(codified) in the permanent regulations of GSA in Title ^1,
Code of Federal Regulations, Public Contracts and Property
Management, prior to its September 1979 expiration. However,
as seems to be the rule rather than the exception, unantici-
pated problems have caused the temporary regulation to be
extended through 31 December 1979 » with a further three-six
months extention expected. The main problem surfaced to
date is discussed herein.
It is proclaimed in the background paragraph of the
draft FPMR, that one of the specific tasks required to
realize OFPP ' s goal of increased reliance on commercial
products, is "the development of a Government-wide management
and control system governing the development and issuance of
purchase descriptions, specifications, standards, and other
documents used to describe commercial or commercial-type
products for Government procurement r36:lj." This is con-
current with OFPP's call for a 'simultaneous systematic




The major innovation presented for the first time in
this draft ?PMR is the creation of a new series of descrip-
tions called "commercial item descriptions' (CID's),
intended to be an alternative to detailed Federal Specifi-
cations. CID's will be formalized under the specifications
and standards program and "are intended to be used in the
acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf or commercial type
products
f 36 i 1^ * The subJ ec 1; descriptions will be in
functional terms to permit a variety of products to quality
for award.
According to an official in the office of the Director,
Federal Procurement Regulations, the introduction, and,
specifically, the definition of the term "commercial item
description," is the subject of a legal "discussion" between
counsels for GSA and the Office of Management and Budget.
In the words of the same official, "civilian agencies have
complained, for some reason, concerning the term, and the
resulting politically sensitive discussions are the cause
of the documents delay ("5^1 • "
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5000.^x (DRAFT)
In February 1979, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (R&E) issued a draft of what was to be the instruction
to implement the policies of DODD 5000.37. Due to the myriad
of diverse comments received and the continuing inability
of the FAR Project Office to complete the relevant sections
of the FAR, this instruction has yet to be published. In
6^

the interim, Defense Acquisition Circular #76-18 was
issued (See Chapter IV).
The most common complaint concerning the proposed
instruction was that it addressed only the acquisition
portion of the policy, and that logistics instructions
concerning distribution aspects of ADCP would be issued
separately by the ASD (MRA&L)
.
Statements of policy, exceptions, and definitions
followed PAR and DAR drafts closely; responsibilities were
established at various levels. Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Directors of Defense Agencies were
tasked with: integration of the policy into the PPBS cycle,
applicable internal directives, regulations, records, and
publications; incorporation organizationally of an element
responsible for market research and analyses; ensuring that
initiation of development efforts were deferred pending
market analysis; informing industry of long range forecasted
commercial acquisition requirements; identification and
assignment of resources (a point of contention) ; and the
establishment of an acquisition focal point at the component
level (sort of a miniature DAS) to coordinate implementation
of the instruction.
The DAR Counsel was tasked with incorporation of ADCP
policies into the DAR.
The Commandant, Defense Systems Management College
(DSMC), would ensure incorporation of the policies into
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existing training programs and course curricula in
coordination with the Federal Acquisition Institute.
This draft proposed the first formal methodology for
the acquisition and distribution of commercial products,
enclosed herein as Appendix C. It was accepted that
applications would vary among items, especially between
consumables and repairable items, and therefore application
would not be mandatory. The methodology was intended to be
a display of sequential actions generally experienced in the
ADCP process, to be utilized to ensure that components
accomplished decision points necessitated by the new
policy.
In summary, this draft offered little in the way of
implementation guidelnes; it seemed instead to be simply
an expanded policy document. Implementation problems would
have been left to components, who would have been tasked to
provide copies of implementing instructions to USD (R&E)
within 180 days of the date of the instruction.
As mentioned earlier, service response was partially
responsible for this draft never being issued. Uncertan-
ties raised are typified by those included in the Navy
response, coordinated by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (M,RA&L). The most common complaint
was that of the perceived workload impact on acquisition
organizations, due to market surveys, development of
commercial product descriptions, and testing requirements.
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A second, potentially more serious concern raised was
the reconciliation of the disparity between the lengths of
time military systems and equipments are utilized and the
shorter longevity for commercial items. This concern was
explained in the ASN(MRA&L) memorandum as follows [_4:l]:
Because of this disparity, a commercial product
alternative could appear initially attractive, but not
be cost-effective in the long run due to commercial
phase-out of the item and attendant support. For in-
stance, using a commercial item for a weapon system
component or item of support equipment may necessitate
replacement of the item early in its life cycle, as
commercial availability of the item and attendant
support are phased out in favor of state-of-the-art
product line improvements. In some instances, such
relatively short equipment life-times may prove cost
effective in terms of the collective benefits of tech-
nological improvements, i.e., cost, reliability,
performance. However, such action would require
budgetary shifts between Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
accounts and investment appropriation accounts. Without
such shifts in budgetary resources, there will be a
tendency to continue present practices of using detailed
specifications and configuration control mechanism as a
necessary requirement for in-house support of operational
equipment.
The Navy memorandum contained several recommendations
such as: integration of the implementation of the acquisition
and distribution aspects of ADCP; emphasis on revision of
existing specifications; review of potential manpower and
organizational impact; establishment of an organizational
capability for centralized market research and analysis;
and, finally, a plea for organizational flexibility to take
the most sensible course of action.
It would now appear as if this instruction will await
the normal flow of the bureaucracy, i.e., FAR completion,
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DAR revision, DOD Directive revision, and, finally, issuance
of the DOD Instruction.
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMPONENT ACTIONS
The services have taken extremely divergent views and
subsequent actions in light of current activity in the
area of commercial product acquisition. Pending the normal
flow of policy documentation mentioned earlier, interviewees
indicated that efforts will remain minimal and uncoordinated.
1. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
"The Defense Logistics Agency buys large volumes of
commercial and near-commercial products for the Military
Services—approximately -158.2 billion in fiscal year 1978
[59*1] •" Although DLA has wholeheartedly supported OFPP
in its reevaluation of the role of Government Specifications
in acquiring commercial products, they have, to date, issued
no formal documents on the subject. Instead they have chosen
to follow an on-going, incremental pilot test approach,
designed as a "learn-as-you-go" technique, permitting
flexibility, and preventing "catastrophic failure which could
result if premature, full-scale acquisition were attempted
in an environment of uncertain policy [59*1] •" Test items
have been selected involving all six DLA buying centers,
and including items currently procured to Federal or Military
Specifications; preferably having in excess of £10,000 annual
usage, with reasonable potential for existing acceptable
commercial items. Acquisition strategies were developed
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emphasizing reduced reliance on detailed specification, and
several buying techniques were utilized; i.e., multiple
award schedules, brand name or equal, commercial item
descriptions, non-Government standards, and tailored Govern-
ment Specifications.
As mentioned in Chapter III, based on a review of
ADCP progress at DPSC , GAO recommended that DLA immediately
implement the policy on a full-scale basis and commit adequate
staff resources to the effort. They also recommended that
DOD clarify its position and "provide guidance to DLA on
how to accommodate both the goals of the socio-economic
programs and the ADCP policy [3^:33*1."
DLA officials replied informally that field activities,
such as DPSC , were hampered by lack of operating instructions
on policy implementation. Informal response from DOD indi-
cated that field activities were encouraged to experiment
and develop imaginative and innovative techniques. They
further indicated that instructions were forth coming.
In a 6 June 1979 memorandum for U3D(R&E) concerning
the GAO report, the Deputy Director, DLA, stated that the
report had "taken the Clothing and Textile pilot text effort
out of context and ignored some of the overall objectives
and accomplishments of the DLA ADCP program [l7:l]. ' He
stated further that what GAO described as a "go-slow"
technique, DLA called a "sensible, incremental approach
which balances trying new things with upholding current
responsibilities." It was emphasized that responsibilities
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such as supply items of requisite quality, maximizing
competition, and fulfilling socioeconomic program objectives
could not be put aside for the sake of any one goal, and that
crash implementation, with inadequate consideration of real-
world relevant factors, would jeopardize the long-run success
of the ADCP program. Following a brief summary of the lack
of published operating procedures, the memorandum ended with
the following statement, which currently summarizes DLA
sentiment in this area [.17 01 s
As a whole, the report fails to recognize the
importance of the Military Services in implementing ADCP.
Their devotion of resources to performing market research
and revising specifications is required to continue ADCP
progress. We noted that although the GAO report summarized
DOD views, DLA views, and OFPP views, it omitted the views
of the Military Services. Actually, at the 21 March 1979
meeting with GAO representatives, the Military Services
specifically upheld the current incremental ADCP approach
and unanimously agreed that the pace of implementation was
about right. Vie believe our record of ADCP participation
confirms out support for the basic program objectives. We
feel over the long run that, our positive, "learn-as-we-
go" approach will prove most successful in accomplishing
these objectives.
2. Air Force Implementation Status
Informal discussion on 20 September, 1979. with the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Develop-
ment and Acquisition, Directorate of Contracting and
Acquisition Policy, indicated that the Air Force has taken
no formal implementing actions pending FAR, DAR, and DODI
policy and procedures publication. They have simply made
all levels aware of the DOD Directive and the Defense
Acquisition Circular on the subject, for application where
obviously beneficial. Further discussion indicated that
Air Force personnel considered good, user-generated market
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analysis the key to the program, with its inherent problem
to the contracting officer in determining the adequacy of
the research effort. The final statement from that office
was that any further action on their part, such as an
instruction, would be pre-mature. The Air Force did,
however, participate in CCAP/ADCP test programs, one of which
is discussed later in this chapter.
3- Army Implementation Status
After OFPP's initial policy statement and amplifying
guidelines in 1977 1 the U.S. Army Procurement Research Office,
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center, began a study to
identify current methods of acquisition of commercial prod-
ucts; develop improved procedures for the acquisition of
commercial products to be documented as a draft pamphlet for
field use; and to recommend regulation changes necessary for
the adoption of the draft pamphlet. The Army includes
commercial products under the title, Nondevelopmental Items
(NDI's).
The proposed, pamphlet, Acquisition Strategies for
Non-developmental Items (NDI's) , has been revised several
times, is currently in draft format, and has been recommended
for issuance by DARCOM or the Department of the Army.
The material needs of the Army are satisfied by
either (1) product improvement of current standard equipment,
(2) buying nondevelopmental equipment, (3) modification of
commercially available items, or (b) initiation of a new
material development program. Method (l) is preferred,
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while (*0 is usually considered to be more costly and less
timely [65 :l]. The Army considers both methods (2) and (3)
to be nondevelopmental acquisition, and those areas, there-
fore, are addressed in the pamphlet. The overall
consideration is the proper balance between the many
potential advantages of these methods (especially cost and
schedule), and the lack of control over design configuration.
It is therefore the intent of the pamphlet to provide a
methodology wherein all major issues are resolved, and risks
are identified and accepted by all parties prior to contract
award. Emphasis throughout is on an expedited process which
relies heavily on market surveys and suitability evaluations.
The objectives are best summarized in the following statement
of the NDI management concept [o^sl-^J:
NDI seeks to take advantage of reduced costs and
compressed schedules through the acquisition of already
designed material in use by the commercial, military, or
Government users. Recognizing the Army's lack of control
over the design of the item, a procedure is followed
which minimizes risks by providing early decision points
on all important questions regarding military suitability
and functional (fit, form and performance) criteria before
a production contract is signed. Reliance is placed on
the acceptability of the candidate item in the marketplace
reinforced through military suitability evaluation, as
required, to answer user type questions. The risk inherent
in NDI acquisition must be understood and accepted by the
combat developer and the material manager before the
decision is made to satisfy the requirement with an NDI.
As a result of the shorter acquisition cycle and earlier
availability for deployment, it is necessary and appro-
priate to rely on commercial supply and distribution
systems for technical, training, and logistic support
during an initial fielding phase.
The remainder of the pamphlet is an indepth
implementation of the stated objective, from the definition
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and validation phase; through production, deployment, and
follow-on evaluation; with particular attention devoted to
the procurement plan, integrated logistics support, and
test and evaluation.
There were several amplifications or additions to
policies and procedures discussed previously. For instance,
what has previously been considered the area of market research
was divided into two separate aspects, the market survey
(user application and acceptance, logistics factors, oper-
ator skills, cost, environmental factors, etc.) and
suitability evaluation (operational performance, support-
ability, military compatability , training requirements, cost
of ownership, human factors, i.e., noise safety, etc.).
From here, the market survey is further divided into two
components: (1) the technical survey and research phase,
and (2) a field survey phase. The objective of the tech-
nical survey and research is to identify potential product
candidates within a required performance envelope; while
the objective of the field survey (on-site) is to evaluate
product performance characteristics and military potential.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this pamphlet
is its attempts completeness, i.e., it is intended to be
a stand alone publication in its application, including all
logistics considerations, without waiting for guidance from
the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M,RA&L).
While there will undoubtedly be some changes required when
policy on the Commercial Item Support Program (CI3P) is
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published, it is noteworthy that this pamphlet has attempted
to present a complete set of acquisition guidelines. Per-
haps it is the lack of published policy in either area,
acquisition or distribution, that has caused this pamphlet
to remain in its draft format for several years.
As with the Air Force, the Army also participated
in CCAP, and their success is discussed later in this
chapter.
4. Navy Implementation Status
Immediately following the issuance of DODD Directive
5000.37. the Navy seemed bound and determined to meet the
implementation deadline contained therein. The office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (KRA&L) routed for
comment a draft SECNAVTNST 5000. xx, the stated purpose of
which was "to promulgate and implement enclosure (l) , which
establishes policies and responsibilities for the Acquisition
and Distribution of Commercial Products [56:1/." Unfortun-
ately, enclosure (1) was just a copy of the DODD, and no
further guidance was included. It was the stated respon-
sibility of the Chief of Naval Material to implement the
directive, a statement which made little sense in view of
the fact that the draft SSCNAVINST was proclaimed to be the
implementing document. Fortunately, the draft received
enough negative comment on its shallowness, that it never
made it to press.
Several interesting ideas can be gleaned from a
perusal of the latest draft. For instance, the researcher
7^

would observe that it will be the intent of the Navy, at
least at the policy level, to apply the commercial product
doctrine to all acquisition considerations. This premise
is supported in the statement of applicability and scope,
wherein it is proclaimed that the instruction will apply to
all elements involved in the establishment/determination
of material performance requirements, specifications, and/or
logistics support concepts; the actual acquisition and
distribution of material (including weapon systems, equip-
ment components, and material items); and the approval of
weapons systems and equipment for service use. This draft
instruction, like the Army's pamphlet, also touched on
supported areas under the CISP; for example, the stated
preference for utilization of "commercial maintenance support
in lieu of the first, second, or third levels of Navy
maintenance where this will result in support cost savings
while still maintaining required levels of availability and
operational readiness [^O^-"
Specific responsibilities were delegated to the Chief
of Naval Operations (requirements formulation, operational
test and evaluation, and approval for service use), and to
the Chief of Naval Material. Among the many assignments
to NAVMAT were a few which are as yet unclarif ied in overall
policy; for example, the establishment of instructions and
procedures for identifying commercial products with
commercial market acceptability with the potential to
satisfy Navy requirements; estimating the relative life
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cycle costs of the acquisition of commercial products and
the use of "commercial contracting practices," distribution
channels and maintenance support and the corresponding
costs of alternatives; and, finally, "to foster competitive
industrial sources for the acquisition, distribution and
support of Naval Systems, equipment and material [9:4]."
In summary, despite various levels of attention in
each service, none has yet to publish a single document
either promoting the general policy statement of the DOD
Directive, or providing implementation guidelines to service
activities. It is highly unlikely that any such document-
ation is forthcoming from the service level, until they
receive some idea of the intended FAR and DAR treatment of
the subject area.
S. PROCEEDINGS OF COMMERCIAL COMMODITY ACQUISITION '.JORKSHOP,
"COMMERCIAL BY DESIGN"
In January of 1978, the Department of Defense co -sponsored
with the National Bureau of Standards the subject workshop
with the stated objectives [22:v|:
To establish a dialog between the Department of
Defense and private industry on the ways and means to
acquire, use and support commercial off-the-shelf products
to meet DOD requirements.
To identify commercial commodity acquisition problem
areas, examine and develop procedural guidelines for
'going commercial', and provide input material for a DOD
'How To' handbook.
To carry the workshop theme 'Commercial By Design'
back home.
These lofty goals were supported by a list of attendees
reading like a "'Jho's fho" in the acquisition arena... Mr.
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Richard Perm, Acting Director, Experimental Technology
Incentives Group, Bureau of Standards; Mr. Dale Church,
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition Policy); the
Honorable Lester Fettig, Administrator of OFPP; the Honorable
''illiam Perry, Undersecretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering); Mr. Hugh T ;itt, United Technologies; Mr. Dave
Packard, Chairman of the 3oard, Hewlett-Packard Company;
and many others. "orkshop topics included user needs,
market research, acquisition strategy, logistics support,
and product evaluation.
A large portion of the discussions, conclusions, and
recommendations emerging from this workshop has already
found its way into many of the draft documents previously
discussed, in particular the FAR and DAR. However, some of
the comments and suggestions which have not surfaced else-
where are interesting to note. For instance, early on in
the workshop it was noted by an industry representative that
the General Services Administration was not a participant.
As unusual as that might seem, no explanation is offered
for GSA's absence.
One interesting statement generated by the workshop on
user needs, summarized the thoughts of almost all proponents
of the commercial product movement in regard to the ability
of the Government to complicate a seemingly simple attitude
change [22 : 25J:
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New simplified procedures should be written for the
procurement of commercial units. It still takes four
to five months to procure a commercial system. Since
the item has been designated and built and its capa-
bilities are known, logic dictates that there must be
a faster way to procure it.
An interesting observation from the panel on market
research was that the Government's primary problem in this
area is that no one ever gets to be an "expert" in any
particular thing. However, the comment went without .any
further amplification, and therefore what began as a strong
indictment, ended as a weak, unsupported grumble. Some of
the impediments to implementing market research cited by
this panel included, negative attitudes of Government and
industry. Earlier discussion has shown that regulations,
rules, and laws may be changed, organizational adjustments
may be forthcoming, and communications barriers will be
attacked by the other two changes (regulations and organ-
izations). However, the researcher would observe that the
impediment which to date has not been successfully thwarted
is the negative attitude of those in the area toward
changing policy.
The panel on acquisition strategy suggested that "DCD
should publish policy, but procedures for implementing the
policy should be left to the Services and Defense Agencies
[22:4o]." Several other recommendations of this panel are
worthy of note, excerpted as follows Q22: ^1-^3 1:
When specification writers are aware of commercial
off-the-shelf equipment, caution must be exercised so
that the specification does not describe a hybrid item
having the" best features from each available unit instead
of the actual Government requirement.
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'•.rhen Government use of an item is similar to commercial
application, no special inspection requirements should be
imposed.
Government contracting officers should be able to
make subjective judgements when awarding contracts for
commercial items.
Authority should be sought for a 'test program'
which would exempt the procurement of commercial items
from those contractual clauses which impose requirements
or restrictions not found in the commercial sector.
''/ithin the next panel discussion on logistics may be
found an indepth analysis of the Commercial Item Support
Program (CISP) concept. Again, while it is outside of the
perview of this paper, the logistics support area is fruit-
ful for research, and, as yet, is far behind in proposals
for implementation.
The final panel on product evaluation, strongly continues
the "reliance on the private sector" theme, stressing,
among other things, utilization of manufacturers product
descriptions and proven QA procedures.
It should be repeated that those areas discussed above
are simply highlights of items either not mentioned in
earlier discussions, or treated differently. Again, a
large portion of the document has been absorbed into pro-
posed rules and regulations. However, it is interesting
to note, in light of the importance of the meeting and
those in attendance, that no formal summary of the
recommendations was ever taken for action by anyone, and
that no follow-on report has ever been published. The
report itself still stands as the most indepth "meeting of
the minds" by the acknowledged leaders in the field to date.
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?. SUCCESSFUL UTILIZATION C? COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SUBSTITUTIONS
Before looking at several examples of successful buys
under the revised policy statement by 0?PP, it would be
useful at this point to re-emphasize the relatively simple
overall objective of the policy which seems to get buried
in a landslide of documentation. One should keep in mind
that the original policy simply called for utilization of
commercial products and commercial distribution systems
where such utilization would be advantageous to the Govern-
ment. It is the how's, where' s, why's, and who's of
"advantageous" that creates the unending flow of verbiage
on the subject. In looking at the following examples of
large dollar savings, lead time reductions, and customer
satisfaction achieved through common sense approaches to
the acquisition process, the researcher wonders at the
necessity for the three year delay in publishing at least
some sort of logical procedure to ensure that such altern-
atives are considered.
1 . Defense Logistics Agency ADCP Results
Any review of ADCP successes or failures should
begin with the DLA program for several reasons. First of
all, the commodities for which they are responsible for
centralized procurement more easily lend themselves to an
"across the board" application of the new procedures; and
second, in view of the fact that DLA ' s large volume procure-
ments of commercial and near-commercial products were of the
type directly addressed by the Commission on Government
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Procurement, the earliest and most complete test programs
have originated therein. ?or these reasons, no one, large
dollar value procurement serves as a good example of the
results of ADCP procedures utilization by DLA. Instead,
representative buys covering some seventy- two items,
utilized by all services, and procured through all DLA
buying activities will be examined. Commodities include
automotive gasoline, bath towels, screws, gloves, electrical
conduit, fuses, librium, x-ray film, solder, soy sauce,
undershirts, and many more. In a paper prepared for pre-
sentation to the 1979 DOD/FAI Acquisition Research Symposium,
DLA officials evaluated results in terms of price, quality,
small business impact, and bidder response ("59 s 3l • High-
lights of this presentation are contained herein.
It is the conclusion of DLA officials that "no
definitive purchase price savings can be predicted solely
as a result of changing the method of technical descript-
ion [59*9] •" However, it was discovered that evaluating
price/quality trade-offs, as specified in the ADCP
methodology, often results in substantive price changes.
As might be expected, DLA found that utilization of
brief commercial descriptions does add some degree of risk
concerning quality of delivered items. However, the ADCP
methodology demands the assumption of this risk, and provides




The one potential adverse impact on small business
mentioned in the DLA report, seems to have been overcome
by prudent adaptation of the ADGP methodology. The concern
was for small business, surviving solely on supplying items
to Government Specification, who would not be able to meet
any sort of commercial market acceptability requirement.
This concern hov/ever was obviated in proposed policy state-
ments, wherein allowances were made to permit consideration
of such products as commercially acceptable. A complete
study of the potential impact of the ADCP policy on small
business may be found in the Naval Postgraduate School
Thesis, The Potential Impact of the Government ' s "Buy
Commercial" Policy on Small Business [70].
It was noted by DLA that increased bidder response
was definitely obtained in the ADCP test procurements.
These results were tempered a bit in the report, however,
noting that increased publicity and priority attention due
to the test nature of the buys may have increased response.
However, it should be noted that ADCP methodology again
calls for increased notice to the private sector concerning
anticipated buys. In that light, it would appear that
increased participation might well be expected.
In summary, the DLA report is extremely optimistic
concerning application of ADCP procedures to their buying
organizations. ,Thile noting that final judgement would be
premature due to insufficient data collection thus far, the
reoort stated that "results suggest that a selective
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approach of improving poorly written specifications based
upon comprehensive market research would achieve the goals
of the 'buy commercial' program ("59: 9
J."
2. Air Force Acquisition of Diesel Pov/ered Ground
Generators--A CCAP Case Study
In late 1971 t the Military Airlift Command suggested
that there might be substantial cost savings available through
substitution of off-the-shelf diesel powered ground generator
sets, utilized commercially by airlines, for turbine
powered ground generator sets then used in support of the
C-5 and C-l^l aircraft. As well as lower initial cost,
greater ease of maintenance and lower fuel consumption
was anticipated.
Since the Air Force was still in the process of
introducing a replacement model diesel generator, built
to Military Specifications and Standards, it was con-
sidered infeasible to study the MAC proposal at that
time. However, by the mid-seventies, fuel availability
problems caused the resubmitted proposal to be accepted
for test.
The first impediment to the proposal came in the
form of the organizational approval structure; the overall
Air Force monitor supported the tests, but approval was
needed from the Air Force generator managers and the Army
(as designated DOD Program Manager for Mobile Electric
Power). By September 1975» agreement was reached to
conduct service tests on available commercial off-the-shelf
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diesel powered generators, with three military standard
sets in the DCD inventory. Two commercial sets were bailed
from known suppliers to commercial airlines.
At this point, without realizing it at the time,
the requirements people allowed the as yet unwritten ADC?
methodology to take affect. There were two known disadvan-
tages to the diesel generators "being considered, (1) they
v/ere not self-propelled, and (2) they did not have the
"required" bleed air capability of the turbine generators.
In this situation, ADCP methodology calls for a cost benefit
trade-off analysis in regard to modifying the requirement,
prior to considering a modification of the commercial item.
In fact, that is exactly what was done. MAC agreed that
the self -propulsion problem could be easily overcome since
requirements to move the generators were minimal. Second,
since these generators would only replace about two-thirds
of the turbine type, the bleed air capability of the remain-
ing third would suffice. Hence, another road block was
overcome.
Test results clearly demonstrated that commercial
item substitution was the most cost effective means of
meeting MAG requirements. Whereas, the original estimate
of fuel savings was 08,000 per day, tests indicate that this
could be as high as $13,700 per day. The following chart





Cost Item Turbine Commercial A Commercial 3
Acquisition (Unit) S 56,000 "1^,085 $18
,
500
Parts Cost Per Unit Yr. 33,537 2,500 1,100
Fuel Cost Per Unit Yr. 38,785 1,982 2,233
$118,322 $18,^87 $21,833
Est. daily fuel savings:=[( 3 38,78 5-2 ,000)oer unit per yr. x 316
[ 365 days/yr.
= 313,700 per day
The acquisition strategy following the tests was to
use performance specifications for off-the-shelf diesel
powered ground generator sets, limiting bidders to manufactur-
ers who have supplied the commercial market, i.e., commercial
market acceptability. Further savings would be recognized
since contractors would test only as they would for comm-
ercial sales, and standard commercial warranties would be
required.
Further impediments, currently foreseen in general
ADCP methodology, were encountered in requesting a waiver
from the D0D Project Manager in order to procure a non-
standard item. The waiver was initially denied as being
directly opposed to the policies and principles associated
with D0D standardization programs. Proponents argued that
being locked into standard models effectively precluded
taking advantage of state-of-the-art improvements. Next,
the waiver was granted with the provision that the solici-
tation contain a statement that D0D possibly intended to
standardize the model selected. Eventually that caveat
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was also dropped, due to the argument that standardization
could not be achieved since testing was for limited
application; i.e., environmental test, such as extreme
weather conditions, were not included.
At the time the tests were completed, the generator
procurement was incorporated into the DOD CCAP. Original
milestones called for solicitation in December 1977, with
award in April 1973, and first delivery in October 1978.
Actually, due to protests (concerning the commercial market
acceptability clause) , the first generator sets were delivered
during the summer of 1979.
While the final savings determination must of course
await field utilization, this procurement was noteworthy
for several reasons. First, the methodology utilized
followed precisely that later formalized for ADCP. Second,
it surfaced the various impediments throughout, both
regulatory and organizational, which must be contended with
in the proposed policy implementation. Finally, the case
supports the premise that there are those in the acquisition
arena who, through a flexible application of logic, have
been able to achieve the results anticipated through eventual
implementation of the formal policy.
3. Army CCAP Results--A navigational Receiver
Mhereas the DLA examples represent substitution of
unchanged commercial items for unchanged requirements, and
the Air Force case study shows unchanged commercial items
substitution for modified requirements, the following Army
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example reflects the substitution of slightly modified
commercial items for an unchanged requirement.
The Army initiated a two-step procurement for
approximately 5000 navigational receivers to be installed
in all Army helicopters. Six potential suppliers responded,
each proposing an off-the-shelf, commercially designed,
general aviation receiver. Two were eliminated by test and
evaluation; the award was then given to the low bidder. A
Reliability Improvement Warranty (RI'7) was incorporated into
the contract, and the contractor assumed total logistics
support.
eventually the equipment was delivered on time
,
performance requirements were met, and "the Army estimates
a per-unit cost savings of ^^,?00 when compared to a
militarized version of the same receiver, coupled with the
elimination of a 3 to 5 year R&D effort and attendant non-
recurring COSts [il-1 : 39] • "
It is important to note that the Army was not
detoured in this procurement due to slight modifications
required for electromagnetic interference and shock. Cost
benefit analysis, based on contractor estimates for the
modifications still pointed to the modified commercial items
Second, with renegotiation of the RI'7 required at the four
year point, the Army has the option to develop organic
logistics support or to continue v/ith contractor support.
This orocurement thus represents the best of both programs,
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ADCP and CISP, and supports the argument that they be
implemented in tandem.
^. The Navy and ADCP--Successes
. Real and Potential
In February 1979 representatives from the Navy
Material Command (MAT 08C) prepared a briefing for the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Policy) concerning
the Navy's experience and observations with the ADCP
Program. The presentation evaluated seven acquisitions
either having utilized ADCP procedures or anticipating
utilization thereof. Three of the cases will be mentioned
briefly, and one will be looked at in detail, since it
involved potential savings, since foregone in view of organ-
izational and procedural impediments incurred.
The first two examples are reviewed because they
illustrate the crossover from the ADCP emphasis on commercial
products, into utilization of mission needs for solicitation
of major system under 0M3 Circular A-1Q9. The two specific
examples used in the Navy presentation also meet the
definition of major systems provided in A-109- The systems
were the Ocean Surveillance Ship (T-AGOS), and two land
based training and support aircraft, the C-93 (SKYTRAIN II)
and the T-44A.
The procurement of the T-AGOS was not unique nor
was it the result of pressures from the ADCP Program. On
the contrary, several similar "unique" support ship acqui-
sitions v/ere successfully concluded in the 1970 's. The
concept utilized is fairly simple. Realizing the growing
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shortage of R&D funds for major systems, and the increasing
importance of using such funds for combat vessels, officials
in Auxilliary Ship Acquisition at the Naval Sea Systems
Command, utilized a market research technique, aimed at
identifying a basic hull design which might then be out-
fitted for various unique needs. The result was the
procurement in 1971 of two commercial research vessels, and
in 1976 the discovery of a standard off-shore supply boat
hull, available through approximately 4 7 sources. In the
proposed T-AG03 acquisition, the off-shore suoply boat
concept was compared during the market research phase with a
tuna-seiner, and a trawler. In view mainly of the fact that
numerous sources were available, the supply boat concept was
chosen. Since the boat is designed to American Bureau of
Shipping Standards, open competition was obtained through
two-step, formal advertising. The important point about
the solicitation is that the entire circular of requirements
(COR), with modifications, contained only about 200 pages,
including appendices. In short, acquisition lead time and
costs were greatly reduced due to continuing market research
by the responsible organization.
The next pair of examples offered involve the
procurement by the Naval Air Systems Command of the C-9B
for cargo and personnel airlift and the T-MfA training air-
craft. It should be noted that although both aircraft are
off-the-shelf commercial versions, the driving factor again
was not the ADCP philosophy, but the lack of R&D funds for
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application in this area. In fact, on official in the
offices responsible for the acquisition of training and
support aircraft was quoted as saying that "anytime we want
a commercial aircraft, its a fight - the system is geared
to design from the bottom up ^l^]-"
Regardless of the reasons for the particular
acquisitions, they still again represent the potential for
the ADCP methodology in systems acquisition. Simply stated,
the C-93 is an off-the-shelf McDonnel Douglas DC
-9, purchased
using a simplified specification for "a new aircraft, medium
size, multi-engine turbofan, FAA certified under FAR-25i
with current air worthiness certificates from FAA air-
worthiness inspections [l^] • " The solicitation was issued
in February 1972, followed by deliveries beginning in
October 1973, under firm-fixed price contracts. Here again,
as with the T-AGCS, the entire Request for Proposals (RFP)
was less than two inches thick.
The second NAVAIR example, the T-*J4B, was initially
purchased in 1976 as an off-the-shelf, multi engine Beech-
craft, Beech King Air 90, trainer.
Both aircraft utilized open competition and testing
only to ensure that manufacturing performance claims were
valid. Again, the benefits included minimal acquisition
lead-time, significant avoidance of R&D and testing costs,
and, in the case of the T-^A, which utilizes contractor
life cycle support, an estimated reduction in operating
and support costs of approximately 50f° [_8j«
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Moving from system to subsystem and component
acquisition, the NAVMAT presentation cited, for example,
the substitution of commercial inertia! navigation equipment
in Navy aircraft. Specifically, equipment purchased util-
izing Aeronautic Research Incorporated (ARINC) standards to
replace militarized navigation equipment in the P-33, P-3C
,
C-93, and C-130 aircraft. The acquisition strategy involved
competitive procurements using the commercial (ARINC)
description, with minimum flying hour requirement specified,
and contractor support. In addition, out-year options were
included in the contract. Estimated benefits, according to
the brief, include an 8^ reduction in acquisition costs
(3230K/UNIT)
, '^20K per year reduction in operation and
support cost, and increased reliability ^3].
The final example deserves a closer look for several
reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it was
highly touted in the NAVMAT brief, and v/as subsequently
abandoned after a long, hard, losing fight with the system.
The program involved identification and procurement of OMEGA
radio navigation equipment for ships to replace the AN/SRN-12
OMEGA sets currently in use, which are bought to a 15 year
old Military Specification, and have long since been over-
taken by market technology. Significant user dissatisfaction
exists with the 3RN-12, due to its obsolescence and time
consuming use. The program drew much attention due to the
pending requirement for 23 Oi.'EGA sets for the new FFG's.
The potential benefits cited by NAVMAT were a state-of -the-ar-
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system with a 60$ plus reduction in acquisition cost [8].
The potential problems cited in the brief were the eventual
death of the program, i.e., shock requirements and "Approval
for Service Use (ASU)," a requirement for equipment destined
for use on a combatant. V/hat follows is a brief review of
the birth and death of the replacement program.
The Standard Navy Omega Navigation Receiver,
AN/SRN-12, was introduced into the fleet in the early 1960's,
at an initial purchase price of $^,000 per unit, and is
currently being procured for approximately .$30,000 per unit
on a sole source basis, built to a Military Specification.
The unit is a first generation OMEGA receiver; is time
consuming to operate; and requires constant attention by
a skilled operator to acquire and maintain accurate position.
In addition, since it does not read latitude and longitude,
special charts and tables are required which must be updated
periodically. The unit is too large and heavy for utili-
zation on small ships, and it is nowhere near state-of-the-
art [12: 2],
The Navy planned to retain OMEGA receivers aboard
ships and submarines as a back up capability to a newer,
more sophisticated system ( NAVS TAR/GPS ) , itself the scheduled
replacement for Transit, a satellite navigation system.
Some low value or non combat ships would not be equipped
with the newer, high cost receivers, and would continue to
rely on the current OMEGA system for years. The SRN-12
receivers currently in use are not projected to be cost
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effective to maintain throughout the 1980 ' s , when the new
systems are scheduled to become operational [36 7.
The objectives of the replacement program were to
reduce operator work load and skill level, increase system
effectiveness, reduce acquisition and support costs, and
reduce system size and weight for possible utilization on
small craft.
There appeared to be three possible alternatives:
(1) attempt to field change the existing units, (2) develop
a new Military Specification, or (3) approve a commercial
receiver. The field change alternative was discarded by the
procuring activity, Naval Electronic Systems Command, since
it did not meet all objectives, i.e., the cost would equal
or exceed the purchase cost of commercial receivers; the
field change would be a major modification requiring re-test
and approval for service use, as well as logistics support
changes; and acquisition would continue to be sole source
to a Military Specification.
The second alternative v/as not cost effective due
to the estimated research, development, test and evaluation
cost of approximately $800,000, as well as the unacceptable
lead time required.
As a result, NAVELEX forwarded a draft Navy Decision
Coordinating Paper (NDCP) in April 1979 via NAVMAT to the
Chief of Naval Personnel recommending replacement of existing
AN/SRN-12 units with modified commercial OMEGA receivers.
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The recommendation was based upon an extensive market survey,
on-board evaluation, and extensive bench testing of available
commercial receivers, conducted by NAVSLSX and NAVSEASYSCOM,
the results of which met all objectives, i.e., low cost,
acceptable performance, and near term availability £^6*].
A reduced testing program was recommended if the selected
receiver exhibited wide acceptance by users (commercial
market acceptability). It was also noted that about a
half dozen U.S. manufacturers produced promising OMEGA
receivers commercially, which, when modified, could be
certified Approved for Service Use (ASU).
The Chief of Naval Material forwarded the NDCP to
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) (OP-9^-2) for consideration,
noting, however, that "modifying the FFG-7 program for a
replacement OMEGA receiver cannot be justified unless CNO
makes a strong commitment to change to the new standard on
all SRN-12 equipped ships [66J
.
"
In a separate memorandum to OP-09^ (Command and
Control), OP-03, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface
Warfare), concurred that age, poor accuracy, and demonstrated
poor reliability, would seem to dictate replacement of the
AN/SRN-12. However, the memorandum further stated that in
a period of severe fiscal constraint, there appeared to be
little justification for a backup to the new satellite system.
It was noted that a sextant and/or dead reckoning provide
similar accuracy to the SRN-12. To that point the memorandum
seemed consistent; however, it went on to say that ships
9^

whose present Transit system was phased out "would be logical
candidates for NAVSTAR/GPS receivers, even though that
system will provide for greater accuracy than required for
known surface warfare missions [36]." Considering the high
cost of the NAVSTAR/GPS, that statement seems inconsistent
with any known acquisition policy, most of which opt for
meeting minimum requirements at minimum cost.
The final paragraph of 'the memorandum supported
utilization of more capable and less expensive commercial
receivers on ships not equipped with TRANSIT.
The death blow for the substitution program came
by letter from the Commander Operational Test and Evaluation
Force to the Chief of Naval Operations in May 1979 stating
that the test program (AC AT III) be established in the MDCP,
meaning that much heavier test requirements than recommended
would be required, with the inherent time delay incurred in
such testing fl3l« Interviewees indicated that this re-
quirement was far more stringent than required, and could
well be looked upon as "rice bowl" protection. This final
delay negated any possibility of using commercial receivers
in the 7FG-7 program, which now will be supported by the
current acquisition of 23 of the AN/SRM-12 receivers,
built to a 15 year old specification, at a cost of
approximately ^30,000 each. Since that is currently the
only ship building project of any significant number of
ships, the potential for commercial substitution in the
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future is remote, i.e., the time for action was overtaken by
regulatory and organizational delays.
G. IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Mhile it is obvious that implementation documentation
must wait at all levels for published policy, beginning with
the FAR, it is equally obvious that various facets of the
ADCP methodology are occurring at various places, on a myriad
of different acquisitions, for various reasons. Everything
from DLA commodity volume purchases, to Navy Systems Commands*
major systems and subsystems acquisitions are utilizing off-
the-shelf commercial products both by logic and as necessitated
by outside forces, such as funding constraints. A quick
review of the sample acquisitions discussed herein supports
the premise that, whether under the auspices of the formal
ADCP Program, or due to the intelligence of certain acqui-
sition personnel (or both), on numerous occasions, money
and time are able to be saved, and are being saved, in
significant amounts through the substitution or first time
utilization of commercial products.
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VI- CONCLUSIONS AND REC0M?/!5NDATI0M5
A. CONCLUSIONS
1» The Commission on Government Procurement was correct
in its findings that there is a need to change the way in
which the Government buys commercial products .
Evidence supports the contention that there is a
general creep in the proliferation of Government specifi-
cations which fragment features of acceptable commercial
items, thereby creating Government unique, commercial- type
items. The result is actually restricted competition since
producers of off-the-shelf products cannot or will not bid
on these items. The concurrent failure to adequately update
existing specifications results in "customized obsolescence."
As evidenced by the example acquisitions in Chapter V, there
is not only a need to change the methods, but also to expand
the application of commercial products wherever possible.
2. The Office of ^ederal Procurement Policy (07PP)
•policy statement is simple in theory but is complicated by
the bureaucracy to which it is addressed .
The overall intent of the policy statement and
guidance memoranda from 07PP is simple, i.e., utilize
existing commercial products and distribution systems when-
ever they will adequately meet Government requirements.
However, as with any proposed change, it is being resisted
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by those who picture it as an attack on their own empires
or "rice bowls" . The simple intent of the policy, however,
is undispu table; when a requirement surfaces, search for an
existing item to satisfy it; if unsuccessful, investigate
the feasibility of modifying the requirement; next, evaluate
the potential for existing product modification; and finally,
the last alternative is to design from the bottom up."
3- Cther than the -policy and guidance memoranda from
0?PP, no policy exists within the Government as a whole, or
within the POD or other agencies, specifically addressing the
acquisition of commercial products .
Many efforts are underway to get such a policy
documented. The key to successful policy establishment is
the completion and publication of the FAR. Until such time,
the DAR draft, the DOD Directive, manual changes, draft
pamphlets and instructions, are " implementors in search of
a policy," and therefore carry no "teeth."
U. The Federal Acquisition Reform Act, Senate Bill S . c-
(or it's follow-on) will provide impetus for implementation
of the ADCP methodology .
The proposed Senate Bill strongly supports the
foundations upon which the ADCP policy has been developed.
Its emphasis on reliance on the private sector, reduction of
specifications, use of functional purchase descriptions,
and recognition of negotiation as an equally acceptable




5- Acquisition and distribution aspects of the volley
should be studied and implemented as one •policy .
Throughout the literature it is evident that
supporters and detractors agree on this point. The main
reason for such consideration is the necessity to examine
total cost or life cycle cost in most acquisition decisions.
The split responsibilities at the OSD level make implement-
ation attempts fragmented at best.
6. The Department of Defense has "toyed" with the policy
for the sake of appearance .
Mhile it is true that policy implementation is
difficult without adequate guidance from the policy origin-
ators, it is also true that sound logic alone would begin to
show some rewards from the ADCP theory. The sudden initiative
shown within DOD in its start of the CCA? a mere five months
prior to CPPP's initial policy statement is evidence of
politics. Most of the meaningful dollar value programs
paraded as CCAP (later ADCP) tests were either heading in
that direction already, or else never made it for organization-
al or regulatory reasons. Millions of dollars have been
poured, into publications, special committees, and consulting
reports, with nothing resulting from any of the findings.
The biggest example of waste in this area was the DOD/
Bureau of Standards Workshop -a waste since its findings
also have all but fallen on deaf ears. The ADCP idea is
treated with the typical "ignore it and it will go away"
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attitude, with an occasional rhetorical statement of support
when pressured.
7. There is a need for a flexible, subjective
implementation guide .
The mechanics necessary for implementation either
already exist in the functional areas, or will exist upon
passage of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act and publica-
tion of the FAR. Therefore any implementation document
should be broad policy amplification, and emphasize a
logical and flexible example methodology. As mentioned
previously, such methodology is already being applied by
logical, constrained, acquisition personnel at various
locations, for a myriad of requirements. It only remains
for emphasis to be placed on such areas as needs deter-
mination (versus wants), market knowledge, and cost/benefit
trade offs. Strengthening of increased, constant utili-
zation of market surveys and analysis, tailored to the
activity, shows great potential for payoff in all areas of
acquisition, except for possibly major combat systems.
Terms such as "commercial market acceptability" must be
generally defined to allow flexibility in application, and
subjective evaluation by Contracting Officer. The proper
use of cost/benefit trade off analysis must be stressed
when dealing in the commercial market place to best suit
requirements at lowest cost. The best possible guide for
developing a flexible implementation document would be a




8. Utilization of the "oro-posed Acquisition and
Distribution of Commercial Products (ADC?) methodology would
result in numerous benefits to the Government .
The benefits to be realized through logical
interpretation and wise implementation of the ADC? method-
ology include: Research and Development cost savings and
time avoidance, lower unit production costs, a shorter over-
all acquisition cycle, increases in competition, and
improvements in the industrial base. Most are discussed
throughout the literature, however it is important to
highlight a few of the ideas. Unit production costs, for
instance would be lower for two basic reasons: (1) non-
recurring costs of R&D are spread out, and (2) high volume
production drives unit cost down. The broadened industrial
base occurs as commercial suppliers become attuned to Govern-
ment requirements and the Government way of doing business
(and vice versa), and therefore become more capable of
responding on a life cycle basis. 'Jhile some detractors
call the ADCP process the death of standardization, that is
far from the truth. The Department of Defense can easily
standardize on an off-the-shelf commercial product, provided
it does not impede technological improvement of the product.
Tn summary, successful implementation will provide for
effective commercial acquisition and support planning,
resulting in an orderly flow of supportable commercial
products which meet user requirements.
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9- There should be little, if any, workload increase due
to implementation of the proposed Acquisition and Distribution
of Commercial Products (ADCP) methodology
.
As discussed previously, most if not all of the
functions performed under the ADCP methodology are being
performed by some element of the acquisition process. There
may be a requirement for redefinition of assignments or
minor organizational changes, but little or no increase in
workload. For example, while the depth and number of market
surveys will increase, specification preparation v/ill decrease
Government specification writers should not v/orry that there
will be any degradation of their overall responsibilities;
the thrust of ADCP is to eliminate unnecessary specifications.
This will permit scarce resources to concentrate on market
research and specification upkeep.
10 . Individual agency test urograms, such as the
Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program (CCAP) in the
Department of Defense, have shifted the emphasis almost com-
pletely away from the original intent of the recommendations
of the Commission on Government Procurement .
T
..*hile the new test programs are extremely beneficial
as noted in the examples cited herein, it would appear that
little or no attention is now being focussed on the areas of
most concern in the Report of the COGP , i.e., small dollar
value, rapid utilization, large volume stock items- This
area was essentially "washed out" of most policy literature
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1- Encourage policy formulation and Publication, and
stress flexible implementation
.
Support passage of the Federal Acquisition Reform
Act; encourage earliest publication of Parts 10 and 11 of the
PAR; encourage emphasis of the program in the DAR; publish a
flexible implementation document (DOD Instruction) encouraging
logical, subjective utilization of the proposed general
methodology
, but allowing for organizational freedom in
activity implementation. Use FAR draft number 1 and the
input for the DAR as guides in preparation of the DOD
Instruction, or preparation of a separate handbook for
emphasis.
2. Merge the efforts and responsibilities for
commercial products acquisition and distribution policy at
the OSD level, and below .
The true benefits of the proposed ADGP methodology
will be gained only if the entire spectrum is developed as
one, integrated policy and methodology. The office of the
USD(R&3) should assume responsibility for all aspects of
ADD ? , wi th input from A 3D ( MRA&L )
.
3. Educate all acquisition personnel in the proposed
Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial Products (ADC?)
methodology application, stressing the benefits to be derived .
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All acquisition personnel, especially those in the
systems, subsystems, and components acquisition arena,
should be aware of the potential for savings through oroper
amplication of the ADCP process. Examples should be
publicized; dollars saved should be recognized, and individual
initiative rewarded.
^. "Think commercial" when "buying commercial. "
Private buyers utilize market surveys, cost benefit
trade off analysis, and functional purchase descriptions,
when acquiring commercial products and the Government should
be no different. Market research and analysis should be
recognized as a function and assigned organizationally;
commercial market acceptability should not be a strict
contract clause, but a subjective decision on the part of
the user, requirements generators, specification writers,
and the contracting officer. As stressed in the Federal
Acquisition Reform, Act, new detailed design specifications
for commercial products should be discouraged. Proliferation
of commercial-type specifications, based on the salient
features of many, should be stopped. Necessary quality
levels in existing items should be matched to requirements.
5. Closely examine Government volume buying of
commercial products .
Stop the mass expenditure of public funds on
specification items, bought for stock, which are obsolescent
prone. Users should be given freedom of choice in selecting
technological needs, unless it can be shown that
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standardization is essential. This was the major concern





KEY DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Commercial, Off-the-shelf (OTS) , Product (also referred to
as "commercial products"). A product in regular production
sold in substantial quantities to the general public and/or
industry at an established market or catalog price.
Commercial Type Product (or "Modified Commercial Product").
A government peculiar product which, though appearing to be
a commercial product, is produced to meet a Government need
that is different from the commercial need. The product is
subjected to a significant physical change or addition and/
or may be inspected, packaged, and identified differently
from its normal commercial product counterpart. It may be
stocked or managed centrally by the Government because its
unique nature precludes production for regular commercial
supply and distribution.
Established Commercial Market Acceptability . Commercial
market acceptability is an evaluation of the product offered,
performed for the purpose of determining a prospective con-
tractor's ability to provide a commercial product that will
conform to the Government's need. To be market acceptable,
a product must be marketed in substantial quantities to the
general public. To be substantial, sales to the general
public must predominate over sales to the Government. If
the commercial products were previously defined by a
Government specification, offers of products which were
acceptable under the Government specification may be con-
sidered under solicitations requiring a product to have
established commercial market acceptability.
Government Specification . A document intended primarily
for use in contracting, which clearly and accurately describes
the essential technical requirements for items, materials, or
services.
ADCP - Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial Products
CCAP - Commercial Commmodity Acquisition Program
C^R - Code of Federal Regulations
CID - Commercial Item Description
CISP - Commercial Item Support Program
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GNO - Chief of Naval Operations
COG? - Commission on Government Procurement
CAR - Defense Acquisition Regulations
DLA - Defense Logistics Agency
DMSS3 - Defense Material Specifications and Standards
Board
DMSSO - Defense Material Specifications and Standards
Office
DOD - Department of Defense
DPSC - Defense Personnel Support Center
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulations
FPMR - Federal Property Management Regulations
?PR - Federal Procurement Regulations
GAO - General Accounting Office
GSA - General Services Administration
GSAI^SS - General Services Administration Index of Federal
Specifications and Standards
MIL-SPECS- Military Specifications
NAVAIR - Naval Air Systems Command
NAVELSX - Naval Electronic Systems Command
NAVMAT - Naval Material Command
NAVSHA - Naval Sea Systems Command
NDI - Nondevelopmental Items
OFPP - Office of Federal Procurement Policy
0M3 - Office of Management and Budget









MAJOR SUBDIVISIONS 0? THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS
Subchapter A - General
1-1 Federal Acquisition Regulation System
1-2 Definitions and S-oecial Policies
1-3 Ethics
1-4 Administrative Matters
1-5 Publicizing Acquisition Actions
1-6 Reserved
Subchapter 3 - Acquisition Planning
1-7 Planning
1-8 Required Sources of Supplies and Services
1-9 Contractor Qualifications
1-10 Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial Products
1-11 Reserved
1-12 Reserved




l-lo Types of Contracts
1-17 Special Contracting Methods
1-18 Reserved
Subchapter D - Socioeconomic Programs
1-19 Small Business Concerns
1-20 Labor Surplus Area Concerns
1-21 Minority Business Enterprises
1-22 Labor Relations
1-23 Environmental Protection
1-24 Protection of Privacy and Freedom of Information
1-25 Foreign Purchases
1-26 Reserved
Subchapter E - General Contracting Requirements
1-27 Patents, Data, and Copyrights
1-28 3onds and Insurance
1-29 Taxes




1-31 Contract Cost Principles and Procedures
1-32 Contract Financing
1-33 Reserved
Subchapter F - Soecial Categories of Contracting
I-34 Major System Acquisition
1-35 Research and Development Contracting
1-3^ Construction and Architect Engineer Contracting
1-37 Service Contracting
1-38 Federal Supply Schedule
1-39 Automatic Data Processing Equipment Contracting
l-'Uo Contracting for Operation of Government-owned
Plants (COCO)
1-^1 Reserved
Subchapter C- - Contract Management
1-^-2 Contract Administration
1-/4.3 Contract Modifications




1-^8 Production and Value Engineering
I-I19 Termination of Contracts
1-50 Extraordinary Contractual Actions
1-51 Reserved
Subchapter H - Clauses and Forms


























































? 3 < °































SOURCE: DEFENSE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL , July 1977
C. E. Mandel, Jr., "Going Commercial"




Air Force, A/F/LEYPS , CCAP Case Study, "Diesel Powered
Ground Generator,
' December 1977.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L), Memorandum to the
Service Secretaries, Subject: Amplication of Commercial
Commodities to Defense Requirements
, 30 December 1975-
3. Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L), and Under Secretary
of Defense (R&E) Memorandum to Service Secretaries;
Subject: Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program , 14
January 1977.
k. Assistant Secretary of the Navy (MRA&L) Memorandum to
the Under Secretary of Defense (R&D), Subject: Acquisition
and Distribution of Commercial Products (ADC?) , 9 February
1979.
5. Butler, w . J., Naval Air Systems Command, (NAVAIR 5335).
Project Engineer for Commercial Inertial Navigation,
28 August 1979 - interview.
6. Chief of Naval Material, First Endorsement on COMNAVSLSX-
SYSCOM Itr 52013: RLA: bk 9^20 ser 219-5201, Replacement
of OMEGA Navigation Receiver AN/SRN-12, May 1979-
7. Chief of Naval Material, Memorandum Ser 3/310^1^ to
Chief of Naval Material, Subject: OMEGA Navigation
Receiver for Surface Ships , June 26, 1979-
S. Chief Naval Material (MAT 08C ) Briefing Papers for Brief
of Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) , Subject: Acquisition
,
and Distribution of Commercial Products (ADCP) Experiences
and Observation , 23 February 1979.
9. Chief of Naval Material (MAT 08C3), (Draft) of SECNAYINST
5000. xx, Subject: Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products (ADCP), undated.
10. Chief of Naval Operations (0P-0 3) Memorandum for CMC
(OP-094) , Memorandum Serial 353I/32, Subject: Replacement
of OMEGA Navigation Venpivpr AN/SRN-1? . 21 May 1979-
11. Chief of Naval Operations 0PNAV INSTRUCTION ^720. 9D,
Subject: Approval of Systems and Equipment fnr Rprvirp
Use, 20 September 197 Ll .
112

12. Commander Naval Electronic Systems Command ltr 52013:
RLDtbk 9^20 3er 219-5201, Replacement of OMEGA Navigation
Receiver AN/SRN-12, 26 April
i
1979.
13. Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force ltr 615:
sld 396O ser 6^7, Subject: NDCP for the OMEGA Navigation
Receiver, AN/SRN-12 Replacement, 22 Nay 1979.
1 ZJ-. Cannos, T. and Peter, C. H.
, Naval Air Systems Command,
NAVAIR (PMA-271), Auxilliary and Training Aircraft, 29
August 1979 - interview.
15. Defense Acquisition Circular -76-18, Acquisition and
Distribution of Commercial Products (ADCF) Policy
Objectives
. 12 March 1979.
16. Defense Logistics Agency Memorandum for Director, Defense
Material Specifications and Standards Office (DMSSO)
,
Sub ,]' ec t : CommercJal "terr Description (^~C) Policy
, 9
August 1979-
17. Defense Logistics Agency Memorandum for the Under
Secretary of Defense (R&D), Subject: GAP Report PSAD -
79-55 (OSD CASE 4 5106) , 5 June 1979-
18. Defense Science 3oard, Report of the Task Force on
Reducing Costs of Defense Systems Acquisition, 15 March
1973.
19. Defense Science Board Report of the Task Force on
Specifications and Standards, April 1977-
20. Defense Science Board Report, Use of Off-the-Shelf
Electronic Test Equipment to Reduce Costs, Shorten Lead
Times, Assure Reliability, and Simplify Logistics , Task
T"orce on Electronic Test Equipment, February 1976.
21. Defense Standardization Manual, POD ^120. VM, Defense
Standardization and Specification Program Policies
,
Procedures, and Instructions , August 1978.
22. Department of Defense and National Bureau of Standards,
Commercial By Design, Proceedings of the E:orkshop .. on
Commercial Commodity Acquisition , January 17-19. 1978.
23. Department of Defense, Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products Croup, List of Pilot Program Candidates
,
1 November 1978.
2'J-. Department of Defense Directive 5OOO.37, Subject:
Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial Products
(ADCF), 29 September 1973.
113

25. Department of Defense Instruction 5000. 4x (draft),
Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial Products
(ADCP)
. 15 February 1979-
26. Naval Electronic Systems Command, NAVEL2X (52013),
OMEGA Navigation Systems, interview, 29 August 1979.
27. Federal Acquisition Reform Act (Senate Bill S.5).
28. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Part 10 -
Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial Products
(draft), 15 March 1979-
29. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Part 10 -
Specifications and Commercial Products
, (draft),
17 August 1979.
30. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Parts 10 and 11,
(draft)
, October 1979-
31. General Accounting Office Report PSAD-77-170, Uniformed
Procurement Decisions for Commercial Products are Costly
,
2^ October 1977-
32. General Accounting Office, Report ^ PSAD-77-171,
Government Specifications for Commercial Products--
Necessary or ' rasted Effort?, 3 Nov. 1977.
33. General Accounting Office, Report # FSAD-78-100,
Legislative Recommendations of the Commission on Govern -
ment Procurement: 5 Years Later , 31 July 19 7 3.
Jk, General Accounting Office Report PSAD-79~55i Opportunities
and Problems in Meeting the Military's Clothing and
Textile Needs with Commercially Available Items , 2 3 April
1979-
35. General Accounting Office, Report FSAD-79-80,
Recommendations of the Commission on Government Procure-
ment: A Final Assessment, 31 May 1979-
36. General Services Administration, Federal Property Manage-
ment Regulation, Temporary Regulation F-59, Commercial
Products , (draft), 5 Mar; 1979.
37. Gorlaclc, Dave, "CCAP: The Initials that Might Spell
Doom for Those 'Spec' Items," Exchange ard Commissary
News, January 1979.
38. Holmes, J. A., Col., USA, "Commercial by Design--Changing
Times and Policy," Army R£D News , January-February 1973.
114

39. Judson, Robert, A Proposed Methodology to Evaluate the
Cost Impact of Government Requirements in the Procurement
of Commercial Products
. 16 March 1979.
bO. Judson, Robert, "The Use of Functional Purchase
Descriptions for Advertised Procurements , " National
Contract Management Journal , Summer 1977.
^1. Mandel, Jr., C. E. , "Going Commercial with the Commercial
Commodity Acquisition Program," Defense Management
Management Journal . July 1977.
-2. Mitchell, Thomas J., "Commercial Equipment: Stretching
the Defense Dollar," Defense System Management College,
November 1977.
^3. Naval Electronic Systems Command Instruction 4000.93,




^~. Naval Electronic Systems Command, OMEGA Receiver, History
Folder, AN/SRII - 12 Modernization Program, (updated).




k6. Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Activity (NESEA)
,
Project No. 79-30-2*1-, Final "Report , Performance Eval-
uation of Commercial Automatic OMEC-A Receivers
, lU June
1979-
^-7. Naval Sea Systems Command, Circular of Requirements
(COR) for Ocean Surveillance Ship, T-AGOS "Class FY1979,
with Modification No. 1, 15 December 1978.
k-8. Naval Ship Engineering Center, Report No. 6666-3 ;4,
Combatant Craft Suitability Evaluation of TELEDYNE TD0-
1000. MICRO MARINE MODEL 1157, and NAVIDYNE S 52-1001/2000
OMEGA Systems , 15 March 1978.
^9. Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Memorandum to
Department of Defense, Veterans Administration and General
Services Administration, Subj: Guidance to Certain
Federal Agencies on Starting Implementation of New Policy
on Procurement of Commercial , December 1976.
50. Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Memorandum to
Department of Defense, Veterans Administration, and
General Services Administration, Subject: Implementation
of Policy on .Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial
Products (ADC P) , 21 Dec. 1977.
115

51. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Memorandum to
Department of Defense, Veterans Administration, and
General Services Administration, Subject: Procurement
and Supply of Commercial Products , 2 l v May 1975.
52. Office of Management and 3udget, 0MB Circular A-76,
Subject: Policies for Acquiring; Commercial or Industrial
Products and Services Needed by the Government , 29 -''"arch
1979.
53- Ostrowski, George, "Footing the 'Total' Bill for Government
Purchases of Commercial Products," NCMA Contract
Management
. September 1979.
5^. Renner, Bob, Office of the Director, Federal Procurement
Regulations, Interview, 29 November 1979.
55« Report of the Commission on Government Procurement,
Volume 3 1 Acquisition of Commercial Products . December
1972.
56. Secretary of the Navy Instruction Number 5000.xx,
Subject: Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial
Products (ADCP)
, (draft), undated.
57- Sherman, Stanley N. , Procurement Management: The
Federal System , 1979.
58. Slinkard, John D. , Col., USA? , Co-Project Manager,
Federal Acquisition Regulation Project, Department of
Defense, "The Federal Acquisition Regulation--Your ''ay
of Life in the Future," NCMA Contract Management ,
September 1973.
59. Stimson and Barnett, Defense Logistics Agency, Buying
Commercial: TThat Morks and What Doesn't ':.'ork , Proposed
Paoer for the DCD/FAI Acquisition Research Sympo s i urn
,
July 1979-
60. Stimson, Richard A., "Correcting the Shortfalls in the
Defense Specifications and Standards Program," Defense
Management Journal, March-April 1979
•
61. Thornley, C. D. , Naval Sea Systems Command, Auxilliary
Ship Acquisition, interview, 28 August 1979*
62. Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) Memorandum for ADCP
Task Grouo Members and DMSSO , Subject: FAR, Part 10 ,
(draft) , 1 6 March 1979-
63. Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) Memorandum for the
Assistant for Audit Reports, OASD (C0MFTR0LLFR)
,




6^. Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) Memorandum for the
Chairman, DAR/ASPR Subcommittee 78-64, Subject: Case
73_<Ii.
i Acquisition and Distribution of "ommercial Prod -
ucts (ADCD
. 13 July 1975.
6«^. TT
'
_/ • . S. Army Procurement Research Office, U.S. Army Logistics
Management Center, APRO 803 (draft), Subject: Acquisition
Strategies for Nondevelopmental Items (IIDI's) , May 1979-
66. '"'all Street Journal. 'Military Industrial Comnlex Becoming
A Wee Bit Less So," Friday, September 22, 1978.
6?. '"ashington Management Group, How Should the Government
Buy Commercial Products? , January 19 7 9.
68.
" Thite House Memorandum for The Honorable James T.
Mclntyre, Jr., Director, OB/IB, Subject: The National
Supply System
, 9 August 1979*
69. 'ilson, Dan S., "The Government—A Commercial Buyer,"
NCMA Contract Management , July 1977.
70. ''oods, VJillie E. , The Potential Imgact of the Government's
"Buy Commercial' Policy on Small Business , Naval Postgraduate





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 2231^
2. Library, Code 01^2 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
3- Department Chairman, Code $k 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
4. Asst. Professor D. V. Lamm, Code S4Lt 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
5. Assoc. Professor M. L. Sneiderman 1
Code 5*Wz
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
6. Defense Logistics Studies Information 1
Exchange
U. S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 238OI
7. LCDR R. W. Kirtley 1
Purchase Division Officer
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard








sit ion of commercial









Government acquisition of commerical pro
3 2768 002 10919 1
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
